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NOTE
THE LATEST AMENDMENT TO 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(C): CONGRESSIONAL REACTION TO THE
SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE
STATUTE
Angela LaBuda Collins'

Everyday occurrences of drug-related shootings and gang violence
have resulted in the expansion of federal criminal laws that seek to implement the national war on drugs.' One of the ways Congress attempted to armor itself in this battle is through the enactment of legisla-

'J.D. Candidate, May 2000, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law
1. See Laurette Domingo Mulry, Comment, Immediate Accessibility or Mere Transport. The Dueling Interpretations of the "Carrying" Element of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), 14
TOURO L. REv. 499, 499 (1998) (discussing Congress' desire to impose enhanced penalties
to help combat the drug problem in the United States). In recent years, Congress has attempted to "get tough" on crime through the enactment of various statutes. See, e.g., Act
of Oct. 27, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-302, 112 Stat. 2841 (amending the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3796dd(d), to combat school-related crimes,
including gangs and drug activities, by establishing partnerships between law enforcement
agencies and schools); Crime Identification Technology Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-251,
112 Stat. 1870 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14601) (granting federal funds to improve
identification and criminal history information systems and promoting the integration of
national, state, and local systems for such things as firearms eligibility determinations);
Drug-Induced Rape Prevention and Punishment Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-305, 110
Stat. 3807 (amending 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)) (creating penalties for distributing a controlled
substance to an individual in order to commit a violent crime against the person); Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13701) (preventing and controlling crime through the encouragement of programs, training and the development of new technologies).
Congress also enacted Sentencing Guidelines intending to limit a trial judge's discretion
in sentencing, thus creating more uniformity in the sentencing of defendants who committed similar crimes. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1998) [hereinafter
SENTENCING GUIDELINES] (trying to create a consistent guideline system for determining
sentences); Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Discretion Under Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 20, 1990, at 1. There has been considerable debate, however,
over the constitutionality and actual effect of the Guidelines. See id. at 7. For a complete
overview of the Sentencing Guidelines, see Anthony N. Doob, The United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines: If You Don't Know Where You Are Going, You Might Not
Get There, in THE POLITICS OF SENTENCING REFORM 199-250 (Chris Clarkson & Rod

Morgan eds., 1995).
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tion, pursuant to the Commerce Clause,2 that punishes individuals who
use or carry a firearm during drug crimes.3 This legislation, 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c),4 requires courts to impose minimum sentences when drugrelated offenses are exacerbated by the presence of firearms
The federal court system sentenced over 10,000 defendants under
§ 924(c) from 1991 to 1996.6 With this many offenders facing mandatory
penalties, numerous appeals resulted from the statute's application to
situations where the narcotics and defendant were found merely in the
same room as the weapon.7 Many of these appeals have focused on ob2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause gives Congress the
authority to enact laws to regulate interstate commerce. See id. But see 144 CONG. REC.
H534 (daily ed. Feb. 24,1998) (statement of Rep. Paul) (opposing the passage of H.R. 424,
an amendment to § 924(c), because crime control and sentencing are powers belonging to
the states, not the federal government).
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1994 & Supp. 1999); see also Mulry, supra note 1, at 499.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). In general, § 924 sets forth the penalties for violations of federal crimes. See id.
5. See id. The federal criminal justice system has used mandatory minimum sentencing provisions since 1790, but only recently have these provisions been enacted as part
of a comprehensive system of sentencing. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 5 (1991) [hereinafter SENTENCING COMM'N REPORT]. This

practice changed in 1956 with the passage of the Narcotic Control Act of 1956, Pub. L. No.
84-728, §§ 105-07, 70 Stat. 567, 570-71, which required minimum sentences for drug importation and distribution offenses. See SENTENCING COMM'N REPORT, supra, at 5. Congress retreated from mandatory sentences because the sentences did not reduce drug
crimes, and enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (1994)) and went
with a maximum sentencing program instead. See id. § 401-05, 84 Stat. at 1260-65. See
also SENTENCING COMM'N REPORT, supra, at 6. In the 1980s, however, a shift of policy
caused Congress to renew support for mandatory penalties, especially in narcotics offenses. See id. at 7-8. It was during this period that Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)
to include mandatory sentences for using or carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking
crime or crime of violence. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, H.R.J. Res.
648, 98th Cong., tit. II, § 1005, 98 Stat. 2138-39 (1984); infra Part I (discussing the legislative history of § 924(c)). For a thorough discussion on mandatory minimum sentencing
provisions, see Michael J. Riordan, Using a Firearm During and in Relation to a Drug
Trafficking Crime: Defining the Elements of the Mandatory Sentencing Provision of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) (1), 30 DUQ. L. REV. 39, 39-41 (1991) (explaining the historical application
of mandatory minimum sentences) and Thomas A. Clare, Note, Smith v. United States
and the Modern Interpretationof 18 U.S.C. § 924(c): A Proposal to Amend the Federal
Armed Offender Statute, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815 (1994) (reviewing the use of mandatory minimum sentencing provisions).
6. See 144 CONG. REC. H10,330 (daily ed. Oct. 9,1998) (statement of Rep. McCollum) (using that statistic to urge support for S. 191).
7. See, e.g., United States v. McFadden, 13 F.3d 463, 464-66 (1st Cir. 1994) (sustaining a government appeal of a court-ordered acquittal where a gun hidden under a mattress
with drugs in the same room was sufficient to show "use" under § 924(c)(1)); United
States v. Hager, 969 F.2d 883, 885-89 (10th Cir. 1992) (rejecting a defendant's appeal of
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taining post-conviction relief for incorrect interpretations of § 924(c).8
With so many situations, cases, and appeals, there was great confusion
among the circuit courts of appeals surrounding the interpretation and
application of § 924(c). 9
conviction under § 924(c)(1) and holding that a gun found in a boot in the living room
where drugs were also found constituted a "use"); United States v. Feliz-Cordero, 859
F.2d 250, 251, 254 (2d Cir. 1988) (reversing the conviction based on a district court finding
that the presence of a gun in a dresser of the defendant's apartment, which also contained
drugs, money, and drug paraphernalia, was sufficient to convict under § 924(c)(1)).
Despite the large number of appeals, few defense attorneys or public defenders have the
resources to appeal successfully a § 924(c)(1) conviction. See David B. Smith, Resources,
Research, and Results: Reflections on Bailey v. United States, CRIM. JUST., Spring 1996, at
40, 41. The law firm of Mayer, Brown & Platt devoted more than 1000 pro bono hours to
appeals in both the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court. See id. Their work resulted in
the Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), decision which is discussed infra at notes
88-109 and accompanying text. See Smith, supra, at 40-41. Now, with hundreds of defendants wrongly convicted under incorrect interpretations of § 924(c)(1), more hours will be
expended. See id. at 41.
8. See, e.g., Bousley v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1604 (1998). The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to this case to resolve the split in the circuits over the possibility of collateral attacks on § 924(c)(1) convictions executed by guilty pleas. See id. at 1608-09. The
availability of collateral attacks was the result of the Supreme Court's decision in Bailey,
516 U.S. at 143, in which the Court narrowed the definition of "use" in § 924(c)(1). See
Bousley, 118 S. Ct. at 1608; see also infra notes 88-109 and accompanying text (discussing
the Bailey opinion). The Court in Bousley held that a defendant can successfully petition
for relief after a guilty plea only if the plea was not entered into voluntarily or intelligently
or if the defendant establishes that he is actually innocent. See Bousley, 118 S. Ct. at 161012; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994) (allowing a defendant to collaterally attack a judgment
"imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States").
The Bailey decision led to the reversal of numerous criminal convictions under § 924(c)(1).
See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 77 F.3d 274, 276-77 (9th Cir. 1996) (reversing the conviction of a defendant under § 924(c)(1) for using a machinegun that was found in a house
with cocaine and heroin); United States v. Abdul, 75 F.3d 327, 329-30 (7th Cir. 1996) (reversing the conviction of a defendant who was charged with using a loaded gun found in
same room as narcotics). See generally 144 CONG. REC. H531 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1998)
(statement of Rep. McCollum) (reasoning that the number of overturned convictions after
Bailey supported the enactment of the latest amendment to § 924(c)).
9. Compare United States v. Edwards, 36 F.3d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 1994) (explaining
that a firearm in proximity to a defendant during the course of a narcotics offense satisfies
the § 924(c)(1) use requirement), with United States v. Jones, 28 F.3d 1574, 1578 (11th Cir.
1994) (holding that the statute requires only the presence of a firearm in an area where the
defendant distributed illegal drugs), United States v. Clemis, 11 F.3d 597, 601 (6th Cir.
1993) (finding that "use" should be defined broadly so that it covers situations where the
defendant had ready access to firearms to secure his drug trafficking transaction), and
United States v. Jones, 990 F.2d 1047, 1049-50 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that "[a] defendant
need not brandish or discharge" a weapon for a § 924(c)(1) conviction and that the court
may infer "use" when a firearm is available and present). See generally Jeffrey R. Kesselman, Casenote, Excuse Me, Are You "Using" that Gun? The United States Supreme Court
Examines 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) in Bailey v. United States, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 513,
526-544 (1997) (examining the different interpretations of § 924(c)(1) in the various circuit
courts of appeal).
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After refusing to hear many cases on the proper interpretation of
§ 924(c),o the United States Supreme Court eventually accepted certiorari and resolved this problem in part by clarifying the definition of "use"
under § 924(c)." The Court held that exchanging a firearm for narcotics
was an actionable "use" under § 924(c)(1),12 and in Bailey v. United
States," the Court interpreted the "use" prong to require "active employment" of the firearm. 4 Great confusion still remained among the
circuits regarding the "carry" prong of the statute, 5 however, until the

10. See, e.g., United States v. Wilkinson, 926 F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that
the legal question in defining "use" is whether the defendant had control over the gun and
then whether the gun facilitated the predicate offense), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1211 (1991);
United States v. Long, 905 F.2d 1572, 1576-77 (D.C. Cir.) (stating that although "use" is
defined broadly, stretching this term to convict a defendant when the record lacks a nexus
between the defendant and the gun, other than the defendant's presence in the room,
would be to eliminate a discernable boundary), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 948 (1990); United
States v. Acosta-Cazares, 878 F.2d 945, 952 (6th Cir.) (requiring that the firearm facilitate
the underlying offense), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 899 (1989).
11. See Bailey, 516 U.S. at 143 (holding that the "use" prong requires "active employment" of the firearm); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 225 (1993) (finding that
the "use" provision is satisfied when a defendant exchanges firearms for drugs).
12. See Smith, 508 U.S. at 225.
13. 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
14. See Bailey, 516 U.S. at 143.
15. Compare United States v. Eyer, 113 F.3d 470, 475-76 (3d Cir. 1997) (reasoning
that conviction under § 924(c)(1) was supported by evidence that the defendant's handgun
was loaded and in a console between the two front seats of a moving car), with United
States v. Cooke, 110 F.3d 1288, 1297 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that carrying a weapon in a
bag located in the bed of a pickup truck was not enough to support a conviction when a
defendant was in the passenger compartment of the truck), United States v. Johnson, 108
F.3d 919, 921 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the government must prove a defendant carried
a weapon on his or her person to establish a § 924(c)(1) conviction), United States v. Taylor, 102 F.3d 767, 769 (6th Cir. 1996) (indicating that the firearm must be immediately
available for use and the defendant must be in the process of transporting the weapon for
the statute to apply), cert. denied 118 S. Ct. 327 (1997), United States v. Willett, 90 F.3d
404, 407 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that § 924(c)(1) requires that if the weapon is transported
in an automobile, that the weapon be in a position where it is easily accessible, such as in
the glove compartment), United States v. Hayden, 85 F.3d 153, 162 (4th Cir. 1996) (maintaining that use and carry are distinct from mere possession, and that the mere presence of
a firearm is not enough to satisfy the statute), and United States v. Price, 76 F.3d 526, 528
(3d Cir. 1996) (indicating that the weapon must have played an active role in the underlying offense to sustain a conviction under the statute). The circuit courts of appeals often
applied wildly divergent interpretations to the statute. See Mulry, supra note 1, at 505-21
(discussing the conflict in circuits over which interpretation to apply to § 924(c)(1)); Kristin Whiting, Note, The Aftermath of Bailey v. United States: Should Possession Replace
Carry and Use Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)?, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 679, 697-700 (1997) (indicating the inconsistent results in circuit court decisions after the Bailey decision); Amy Sullivan Broadbent, Carrying on After Bailey v. United States: Where Will the Supreme Court
Go from Here?, FED. LAW., Mar./Apr. 1998, at 22, 24-27 (noting the different approaches
to § 924(c)(1) in the circuits). See generally Thomas J. Eme, The Meaning of "Carries" in a
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Supreme Court resolved this issue in Muscarello v. United States.16 The
Muscarello Court held that the term applies when a person knowingly
possesses and conveys a firearm in a vehicle during and in relation to a
drug crime. 1
Shortly after the Supreme Court issued these opinions, several members of Congress expressed their disappointment with the Court's interpretation of "use" under § 924(c). 8 Almost immediately, representatives
introduced bills to combat the restrictive effects of the opinion; however,
none of these bills were enacted." Nevertheless, in November of 1998,
Congress succeeded in enacting S. 191, which amended § 924(c) by adding a possession requirement to the statute.2 This amendment directly
responded to the Supreme Court's limitation of the "use" prong.2 1
By enacting S. 191, Congress amended the statute22 to extend its reach
Post-Bailey World, CRIM. JUST., Winter 1998, at 12 (exploring the differing meanings of
"carries" after the Bailey decision).
16. 118 S. Ct. 1911 (1998).
17. See id. at 1913-14.
18. See 142 CONG. REC. S1976 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1996) (statement of Sen. Helms)
(introducing a bill in response to the "tragic result of an unfortunate and unwise Supreme
Court decision"); 142 CONG. REC. S7764-65 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Sen.
DeWine) (initiating a bill that would have inserted the words "or has a firearm in close
proximity" in the statute).
19. See infra notes 220-22 and accompanying text (examining the bills enacted soon
after the Bailey decision).
20. See Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469.
21. See 144 CONG. REC. S12,670 (daily ed. Oct. 16,1998) (statement of Sen. DeWine)
(congratulating the Senate on the passage of the "Bailey Fix Act").
22. Before the amendment, the statute provided:
Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime which provides for
an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous
weapon or device) for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United
States, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for
such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment
for five years, and if the firearm is a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun,
or semiautomatic assault weapon, to imprisonment for ten years, and if the firearm is a machinegun, or a destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, to imprisonment for thirty years. In the case of his
second or subsequent conviction under this subsection, such person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years, and if the firearm is a machinegun, or a
destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, to
life imprisonment without release. Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the court shall not place on probation or suspend the sentence of any person
convicted of a violation of this subsection, nor shall the term of imprisonment
imposed under this subsection run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment including that imposed for the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime
in which the firearm was used or carried.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994).
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to defendants who possess a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime or crime of violence and to increase the penalties for second of23
fenses. The statute also provides that a defendant may not serve an enhanced sentence concurrently with the sentence for the underlying of-

For § 924(c)(1) purposes, a "drug trafficking crime" is defined as "any felony punishable
under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. [§] 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances
Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. [§] 951 et seq.), or the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App. [§] 1901 et seq.)." Id. § 924(c)(2). Additionally, "crime of violence" in the context of § 924(c)(1) means a felonious offense that involves a substantial
risk of physical force against a person or property, or attempted, threatened, or actual
physical force against a person or property. See id. § 924(c)(3).
23. See Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469. The amendment
replaced subsection (c) with the following:
(c)(1)(A) Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise
provided by this subsection or by any other provision of law, any person who,
during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime that provides for an enhanced
punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device)
for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or
carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm,
shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years;
(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of
not less than 7 years; and
(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of
not less than 10 years.
(B) If the firearm possessed by a person convicted of a violation of this subsection(i) is a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or semi-automatic assault
weapon, the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less
than 10 years; or
(ii) is a machinegun or a destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment not less than 30 years.
(C) In the case of a second or subsequent conviction under this subsection, the
person shall(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years; and
(ii) if the firearm involved is a machinegun or a destructive device, or is
equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, be sentenced to imprisonment for life.
(D) Notwithstanding any other provision of law(i) a court shall not place on probation any person convicted of a violation of
this subsection; and
(ii) no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection
shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed on the
person, including any term of imprisonment imposed for the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime during which the firearm was used, carried, or
possessed[.]
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fense and is ineligible for parole for the mandatory § 924(c) sentence.14
The addition of the possession standard and increased penalties continues Congress' attempts to get tough on crime.25
This Note examines the latest amendment to § 924(c). First, this Note
explores the legislative history of § 924(c) in an attempt to discover
Congress' intent in enacting and then amending the statute. This Note
then discusses the various interpretations of § 924(c) and the Supreme
Court's attempts to define and clarify the meaning of the terms in the
statute by reviewing the Supreme Court's decisions in Smith v. United
States, Bailey v. United States, and Muscarello v. United States. Finally,
this Note analyzes the most recent amendment to § 924(c), the result of
congressional reaction to the Bailey decision.
I.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY BEHIND §

924(c)

Section 924, part of the United States Criminal Code, outlines additional penalties that may be levied upon criminal defendants.26 Congress
first enacted § 924(c) as part of the Gun Control Act of 196827 to proscribe the use and carrying of an unlawful weapon when engaged in a
federal felony. 8 The enhanced punishment for using or carrying a gun in
relation to a crime first appeared as an amendment to the then proposed
Act." Representative Poff, the chief legislative sponsor of § 924(c), said
that the provision sought "to persuade the man who is tempted to commit a Federal felony to leave his gun at home."3 °

24. See id. (replacing subsection (c) with § 924(c)(1)(D)). Congress intended for the
defendant to serve the mandatory sentence under § 924(c) prior to the start of the sentence for the underlying offense. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 313 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3491-92 (explaining the 1984 amendments that were intended to clarify the law); see also infra Part I (outlining the problems with the law that led to several
congressional amendments).
25. See 144 CONG. REC. H10,329 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1998) (statement of Rep. McCollum) (supporting S.191 as "an important step in the battle against firearm violence" and
"a clear message to violent predators that the criminal use of guns will not be tolerated").
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 924.
27. Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968).
28. See id. § 102, 82 Stat. at 1224; Mulry, supra note 1, at 502 (discussing the intent of
Congress in enacting § 924(c)).
29. See 114 CONG. REc. 22,231-48 (1968) (statement of Rep. Poff). Representative
Poff introduced the amendment to the Gun Control Act on July 16, 1968. See id. at
22,231.
30. Id.; see also Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 405-06 (1980) (describing Rep.
Poff's comments as "crucial material" when, interpreting § 924(c)); Simpson v. United
States, 435 U.S. 6, 13-14 (1978) (noting that Rep. Poff's comments on § 924(c) are "clearly
probative" and "certainly entitled to weight"); infra notes 33-34 (explaining the importance of the Simpson and Busic cases).
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The "carrying" portion of the law, however, applied only to defendants
who did not have a permit for the gun.31 The provision faced criticism
because, if a defendant had a permit for the gun, the enhanced punishment for carrying a gun during the felony did not apply.32 Additionally,
the law encountered more criticism because the Supreme Court initially
interpreted § 924(c) as an "enhancement provision" rather than a separate offense and a means of imposing longer sentences. The early cases
applied § 924(c)(1) only if the underlying offense did not have statutorily
imposed enhanced sentences. 4
The current language of § 924(c) is the result of six amendments during
a ten year period.35 The first, a result of the Comprehensive Crime Con-

31. See Gun Control Act of 1968, § 102, 82 Stat. at 1224 (applying the carrying requirement to those who carry guns "unlawfully"); Clark D. Cunningham & Charles J.
Fillmore, Using Common Sense: A Linguistic Perspective on Judicial Interpretations of
"Use a Firearm",73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159, 1191-93 (1995) (indicating that "carries a firearm unlawfully" limited the statute's application to felons who did not have a gun permit
and outlining the legislative history behind the original version of § 924(c)(1)).
32. See Cunningham & Fillmore, supra note 31, at 1191 (discussing the loophole in
the law that allowed defendants to bypass punishment under § 924(c)(1) when the underlying crime allowed for additional penalties). The law faced criticism on other grounds
also. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 312 (1983), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3490 (reviewing the problems with the statute); Whiting, supra note 15, at 685 (noting that the
original version of § 924(c)(1) was criticized as ineffective because of the "lawful carrier"
exception and the failure to ban parole).
33. See Busic, 446 U.S. at 404, 410 (holding that a defendant may not be independently prosecuted and sentenced under § 924(c)(1) if he had been sentenced under another
statute); Simpson, 435 U.S. at 16 (finding that a defendant could not be sentenced under
both § 924(c)(1) and the enhanced punishment provision of § 2113(d) for a bank robbery);
Clare, supra note 5, at 823 (discussing the Supreme Court's early interpretations of the
statute as an enhancement provision).
34. See Busic, 446 U.S. at 404-05; Simpson, 435 U.S. at 16. The Supreme Court based
its decision in Busic on the Simpson decision concerning the sentencing provisions of
§ 924(c)(1). See Busic, 446 U.S. at 404 (relying on the language and reasoning of the
Simpson decision). In Simpson, the defendants were sentenced under § 924(c)(1) and
§ 2113(a) and (d) for using handguns to perpetrate an aggravated bank robbery. See
Simpson, 435 U.S. at 9. The Supreme Court held that the defendants may not be sentenced under the enhanced punishment provision in § 2113(d) and § 924(c)(1) because the
legislative history did not support that construction of § 924(c)(1). See id. at 16. The
Court relied on Representative Poff's floor statement that his amendment was not applicable to §§ 2113 or 2114 of Title 18. See id. at 13 (citing 114 CONG. REc. 22,232 (1968)
(statement of Rep. Poff)). The Busic Court, in light of the Simpson decision, found it impossible to conclude that § 924(c) applied where the predicate felony contained its own
enhancement provision. See Busic, 446 U.S. at 404 (also using the doctrine of "stare decisis" as part of its reasoning).
35. See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, § 110102(c)(2), 108 Stat. 1796, 1996, 1998 (Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act) (adding a semi-automatic weapon to the list of firearms punishable by the ten year mandatory sentence); Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
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trol Act of 1984,36 recognized a need to amend the statute in the face of
the Simpson and Busic decisions that diminished the effectiveness of the
statute. 37 The amendment, part of an extensive bill that revised many areas of federal criminal law, closed the loophole left open by the earlier
Busic decision.38 The Senate Committee on the Judiciary also revised the
statute to ensure that anyone who commits a federal crime of violence
receives a mandatory sentence without the possibility of parole or serving concurrent sentences. 39 The change further amended § 924(c) to require mandatory five year sentences, without parole, for offenders who
carried firearms during, and in relation to, the commission of any crime
of violence.40
647, § 1101, 104 Stat. 4789, 4829 (imposing imprisonment for ten years if the firearm is a
short-barreled rifle or shotgun, and adding "destructive device" to the list of weapons covered); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6212, 102 Stat. 4181, 4360
(Anti-Drug Abuse Amendments Act of 1988) (redefining "drug trafficking crime" as "any
felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or the Maritime Drug
Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1091 et seq.)"); id. § 6460, 102 Stat. at 4373-74 (increasing the length of imprisonment for offenses involving machineguns from 10 to 30
years, for second or subsequent offenses from 10 to 20 years and for second or subsequent
offenses involving machineguns to imprisonment for life); Firearms Owners' Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104(a)(2)(A)-(F), 100 Stat. 449, 456-57 (1986) (amending the
statute to address drug trafficking crimes under subsection (1), defining drug trafficking
crime in subsection (2), and imposing more severe penalties for machineguns and firearms
equipped with a silencer); Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, H.R.J. Res. 648,
98th Cong., § 1005, 98 Stat. 2138-39 (1984) (affixing a minimum sentence of five years for a
first offense and a mandatory sentence of ten years for a second conviction); see also
Whiting, supra note 15, at 682-83 (describing the various amendments as "piece-meal tinkering depending on the public policy of the moment").
36. H.R.J. Res. 648, § 1005, 98 Stat. at 2138-39.
37. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 312-13 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3490-91.
38. See H.R.J. Res. 648, § 1005, 98 Stat. at 2138-39 (requiring sentences to run concurrently and prohibiting parole; see also Busic, 446 U.S. at 404, 410 (finding that a defendant could not be prosecuted and sentenced under both § 924(c)(1) and another statute).
39. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 313, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3491.
40. See H.R.J. Res. 648, § 1005, 98 Stat. at 2138-39. Congress amended the statute
after recognizing the problems with the application of § 924(c)(1) through the Busic and
Simpson decisions. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 312-13 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3490-91. The amended version changed "any felony" to "any crime of
violence" and the words "and in relation to" were inserted after "during." See id. The
Senate Committee on the Judiciary noted that Congress originally designed the "unlawfully carrying" language to protect police officers and those licensed to carry a weapon
from additional prosecution. See id. at 314 n.10, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3492.
The Committee eliminated the "unlawfully" provision because it felt that persons who
abuse the privilege of carrying a weapon should be prosecuted. See id. Congress added
the "in relation to" language to allay the concern that those lawfully carrying a weapon
would be prosecuted under § 924(c). See id. The term "unlawfully," referring to the carrying of a firearm, was eliminated and the amendment merged the separate sections of use
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Congress amended § 924(c) again in 1986 as part of the Firearms Owners' Protection Act. 4' These amendments designated subsection (1) as
using or carrying a firearm, and defined drug trafficking crime and crime
of violence in subsections (2) and (3) respectively.42 The statute required
five year mandatory sentences for those who used or carried a firearm
during and in relation to a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.43
Ultimately, the purpose of these amendments was to impose more severe
penalties when firearms were involved in the commission of a felony, especially a drug trafficking crime. 44
In 1988, Congress modified the definition of drug trafficking crime, to
incorporate any crime punishable under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, the Controlled Substances Act, and the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act into the definition.
Subsequent
amendments in 1990 and 1994 expanded the types of firearms covered
and increased the mandatory sentences for certain offenses.46 The 1990
amendment imposed imprisonment for ten years if the firearm used or
carried was a short-barreled rifle or shotgun and added "destructive device" to the list of weapons covered. 47 The 1994 amendment added a
"semiautomatic assault weapon" to the list of firearms punishable by a
ten year mandatory sentence.
and carry. See H.R.J. Res. 648, § 1005, 98 Stat. at 2138-39. The revision also included offenses that already provided for enhanced punishment, such as the bank robbery statute at
issue in the Simpson case. See H.R.J. Res. 648, § 1005, 98 Stat. at 2138-39; see also S. REP.
No. 98-225, at 313, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3491 (noting that § 924(c) should apply to crimes that provide for enhanced sentences and that those sentences should not run
concurrently).
41. Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104(a)(2)(A)-(F), 100 Stat. 449, 456-57 (1986).
42. See id. § 104(a)(2)(A),(F), 100 Stat. at 456-57.
43. See id. § 104(a)(2)(B)-(C), 100 Stat. at 456-57; see also Jamilla A. Moore, Comment, These are Drugs. These are Drugs Using Guns. Any Questions? An Analysis of the
Diverse Applications of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), 30 CAL. W. L. REV. 179, 181 (1993) (suggesting that the addition of "drug trafficking crime" was consistent with the report of the
United States Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime, which recommended the
application of § 924(c)(1) to all federal felonies).
44. See Mulry, supra note 1, at 505 (quoting Riordan, supra note 5, at 46 n.55, for the
idea that the purpose of the amendments was to create harsher sentences).
45. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6212, 102 Stat. 4181,
4360 (defining a drug trafficking crime as "any felony punishable under the Controlled
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act
(21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1091
et seq.)").
46. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103322, § 110102(c)(2), 108 Stat. 1796, 1998; Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647,
§ 1101, 104 Stat. 4789, 4829.
47. See Crime Control Act, § 1101, 104 Stat. at 4829.
48. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, § 110102(c)(2), 108 Stat. at
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The sixth, and most recent amendment to § 924(c) passed in November
of 1998, when Congress added possession in furtherance of a crime as an
alternative to the "uses or carries" language.4 9 The amendment also increased the penalties for second offenses and added penalties for brandishing and discharging the weapon.50
II. COURT CHALLENGES TO § 924(c)
The Supreme Court recently decided several cases that grapple with
the congressional intent of § 924(c)." These cases have dealt with every
aspect of § 924(c) from the proper venue for trying a defendant under

1998.
49. See Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469.
50. See id.
51. See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1919 (1.998) (finding that
the "carrying" provision of § 924(c)(1) includes carrying a gun in a vehicle); United States
v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1997) (holding that § 924(c)(1) forbids both state and federal
courts from directing that the five year mandatory sentence run concurrently with any
other sentences); Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143 (1995) (interpreting the "use"
prong of § 924(c)(1) to mean "active employment"); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223,
236-37 (1993) (finding that exchanging a firearm for drugs constitutes a "use" under the
statute); Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) (finding that, for § 924(c)(1) purposes, "conviction" means a "finding of guilt by a judge or jury"). The Smith decision is
reviewed infra notes 54-82 and accompanying text; the Bailey decision is discussed and
analyzed infra 88-109 and accompanying text; the Muscarello case is discussed infra notes
112-73 and accompanying text.
In Gonzales, the defendant was convicted of state robbery charges, and later, federal
narcotics charges. See Gonzales, 520 U.S. at 3. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit held that the defendant's § 924(c)(1) sentence may run concurrently
with the state sentence that the defendant already had begun to serve. See United States
v. Gonzales, 65 F.3d 814, 819 (1995), vacated, 520 U.S. 1 (1997). The Supreme Court,
however, disagreed and held that Congress clearly intended for the § 924(c) sentence and
any other sentence to run consecutively. See Gonzales, 520 U.S. at 5.
In Deal, the defendant was convicted of six counts of bank robbery and carrying and
using a firearm during and relation to a violent crime. See Deal, 508 U.S. at 130. The
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas sentenced the defendant to
five years for the first § 924(c)(1) count and twenty years for each of the other five
§ 924(c)(1) counts under the statute's requirement for second or subsequent offenses. See
id. at 130-31. The defendant argued that because the District Court entered only a single
judgment on all counts, he was convicted only once and therefore should not be subject to
the "second or subsequent" provision of § 924(c)(1). See id. at 130. The Supreme Court,
in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, affirmed the decision and held that, under the
statute, the term "conviction" means a finding of guilt by a judge or jury. See id. at 132.
Thus, because the defendant was convicted of six counts, the lowest court correctly applied the sentence. See id.

1330

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol.48:1319

the statute 52 to the availability of collateral attacks under the statute. 3
A.

"Using" a Weapon under Smith and Bailey

The Court first examined the "use" provision of § 924(c)(1) in Smith v.

United States.14 Prior to Smith, a conflict existed among the circuit courts
of appeal on the issue of whether exchanging a firearm for narcotics constituted a "use" under the statute.5 The Supreme Court granted certio-

52. See United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 119 S. Ct. 1239, 1244 (1999) (explaining
that the proper venue for trying a § 924(c)(1) charge is that which has venue over the underlying crime). In Rodriguez-Moreno, the defendant was charged with kidnapping and
using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence. See id. at 1242. During the commission of the kidnapping, the defendant traveled through Texas, New Jersey, New York,
and Maryland; however, the defendant only carried the firearm in Maryland. See id. at
1241. After, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey rejected Rodriguez-Moreno's argument against the application of § 924(c)(1) and convicted him, Rodriguez-Moreno appealed his § 924(c)(1) conviction for lack of venue, claiming that Maryland was the only place he used or carried the gun. See id. at 1242.
The Supreme Court affirmed Rodriguez-Moreno's conviction because of the fact that
the kidnapping continued throughout the four states, which made the charge valid in any
of those venues. See id. at 1244. Based on that finding, the Court held that the § 924(c)(1)
charge was proper in any venue where the charge for the underlying crime was appropriate. See id. Justices Scalia and Stevens, in dissent, argued that a § 924(c)(1) violation can
occur only when the defendant uses or carries the firearm while committing the underlying
crime. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia stated that the language of the law required
prosecution in the venue where this definition is completely satisfied. See id.
53. See Bousley v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 1610-12 (1998) (holding that a defendant can successfully petition for relief after a guilty plea only if the plea was not entered into voluntarily or intelligently or if the defendant establishes that he is actually innocent); see also supra note 8 and accompanying text (analyzing the Bousley decision).
54. 508 U.S. 223, 225 (1993).
55. See Smith, 508 U.S. at 227. This conflict within the circuits had come before the
Court in 1991. See United States v. Featherson, 949 F.2d 770, 776 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,506 U.S. 930 (1992). Justices White and Thomas dissented from the Court's denial of
certiorari arguing that the large amount of conflict among the circuits warranted a grant of
certiorari in order to clarify § 924(c)'s meaning and scope. See Langston v. United States,
506 U.S. 930, 930-32 (1992).
The Smith case arose from a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit that held that the language of § 924(c)(1) did not require the firearm to
be actually used as a weapon. See Smith v. United States, 957 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir.
1992), affd, 508 U.S. 223. Shortly before the Eleventh Circuit decision, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled similarly. See United States v. Harris,
959 F.2d 246, 261-62 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (noting that the language of § 924(c)(1)
was broad enough to cover the exchange of firearms for drugs, and that there was no reason why Congress would not allow this type of situation to be actionable under the statute). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held, however, that exchanging a firearm in a drug transaction did not constitute "use" under § 924(c)(1). See
United States v. Phelps, 877 F.2d 28, 29-31 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the statute's purpose would not be served by convicting Phelps for using his firearm for barter).
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rari in Smith to resolve this conflict. 6 In this six to three decision, 7 the
Court found that bartering for drugs with a firearm constituted an actionable "use" under § 924(c)(1)."
In Smith, petitioner John Angus Smith offered to exchange an automatic weapon for cocaine with an undercover officer to secure drugs to
later resell. 9 Eventually, law enforcement authorities arrested Smith and
then charged him with knowingly using a firearm during and in relation
to a drug trafficking crime under § 924(c)(1). 60 Smith received the mandatory thirty year sentence for "using" an automatic weapon with a silencer. 1 On appeal, Smith argued that § 924(c)(1) applied only when the
62
firearm was used as a weapon and not for other uses, such as bartering.
The Smith Court agreed with the Eleventh Circuits' prior decision and63
§ 924(c)(1).
held that trading a firearm for drugs constitutes a "use" under
The Court first examined the ordinary meaning of the word "use" and
defined it as "[t]o make use of[,] to convert to one's service[,] or to employ."6 Smith's attempt to exchange his firearm for cocaine, the Court

56. See Smith, 508 U.S. at 227.
57. See id. at 224. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which the
Chief Justice and Justices White, Blackmun, Kennedy, and Thomas joined. See id. Justice
Blackmun also filed a concurring opinion while Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Stevens
and Souter, filed a dissenting opinion. See id. at 241.
58. See id. at 225.
59. See id. at 225-26. Smith and the undercover officer, who presented himself as a
pawnshop owner, met in a hotel room, whereupon they agreed on a trade of the defendant's weapon for narcotics. See id. When the officer left the motel room to "obtain" the
narcotics, Smith grew impatient and left the motel with his weapons. See id. Officers
watching the motel followed Smith and a high-speed chase ensued. See id. Eventually, the
officers apprehended Smith and a search of his vehicle revealed five weapons, two silencers, and ammunition. See id.
60. See id. at 226. Along with the § 924(c)(1) charges, the grand jury in the District
Court for the Southern District of Florida charged Smith under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
846, conspiracy to possess cocaine and attempt to possess cocaine, both with intent to distribute. See id.; see also 21 U.S.C. §§841(a)(1), 846 (1994).
61. See Smith, 508 U.S. at 227. Under § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii), when the firearm is a "machinegun" or is fitted with a silencer, the mandatory sentence is thirty years. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) (1994 & Supp. 1999); see also id. § 921(a)(23) (defining term "machinegun" to include automatic weapons as defined in the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C.
5845(b) (1994)).
62. See Smith, 508 U.S. at 227. The Smith case arose from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which held that the language of § 924(c)(1) did not require the firearm to be used as a weapon. See United States v. Smith, 957 F.2d 835, 837
(11th Cir. 1992), affd, 508 U.S. 223. The Eleventh Circuit held that any use of the firearm
in the facilitation of the offense would suffice under § 924(c)(1). See id.
63. See Smith, 508 U.S. at 241 (affirming the Eleventh Circuit's decision subjecting
Smith to § 924(c)(1)'s mandatory 30 year sentence).
64. Id. at 228-29 (quoting definitions from BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1541 (6th ed.
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reasoned, thus constituted a "use" or "employment" of his gun." Although this definition supported Smith's conviction, the Court further interpreted the meaning of "use" in light of the surrounding terms used in
the statute. 66 The Court looked to § 924(d)(1) to aid in its interpretation
of Congress' intent in choosing the word "use" in § 924(C)(1). 6 That section acknowledges that a firearm could be "used" for trade. 6' The majority reasoned that, if a weapon could be "used" for trade or transfer in
69
the § 924(d)(1) scheme, it could also be "used" for trade under § 924(c)(1).
The Court concluded that it could not find that the word "use" held two
different meanings in two closely related statutes.7 °
In dissent, Justices Scalia, Stevens, and Souter disagreed with the majority about the ordinary and natural meaning the Court gave to the
word "use." 7 ' They argued that the majority did not "grasp the distinction between" the possible and ordinary application of a word. 72 To the
dissenters, "using" a firearm, in its ordinary sense, means using the firearm as a weapon.73 Scalia applied the United States Sentencing Guide1990) as well as WEBSTER'S

NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2806 (2d ed. 1950)).
The Court further recognized that it had employed a similar meaning for "use" over one
hundred years earlier in Astor v. Merritt,111 U.S. 202, 213 (1884), when it defined "in use"
as "'to employ"' or "'to derive service from."' See Smith, 508 U.S. at 229; see also Kesselman, supra note 9, at 535-36 & n.214 (discussing the Court's interpretation of "use" in the
Astor case).
65. See Smith, 508 U.S. at 229 (holding an exchange of guns for drugs "falls squarely
within" the Court's previous definition of "use").
66. See id. (stating that a word's meaning cannot be interpreted without the context
of the surrounding language).
67. See id. at 234.
68. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(d)(1) (1994). Under § 924(d)(1), "any firearm or ammunition
intended to be used in any offense" listed in § 924(d)(3) is subject to seizure and forfeiture. Id. Section 924(d)(3) lists, inter alia, offenses where firearms are used both as weapons and in other ways. See id. § 924(d)(3)(C) (referring to the offenses listed in § 922(a)(5)
that prohibit the interstate transfer, sale, trade, gift, transport, or delivery of any firearm).
69. See Smith, 508 U.S. at 234-36. Section 924(d)(3) also refers to crimes of violence,
as defined in § 924(c). See 18 U.S.C. § 924(d)(3)(A). If that term is incorporated by reference, it makes sense that the meaning of "use" can also be incorporated into the section.
See id. § 924(d)(1).
70. See Smith, 508 U.S. at 235 (citing United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assoc., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988), for the proposition that the same
word should not be given two separate meanings in similar statutory provisions).
71. See id. at 241-47 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. See id. at 242 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia relied heavily on the notion
that the Court must give non-technical words their "ordinary meaning." See id. (citing
Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 461-62 (1991) (requiring that when terms are not
defined by Congress, the words' ordinary meaning should apply) and Perrin v. United
States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (same)).
73. See id. at 242 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argued that the conflicting
majority and dissenting opinions in the Smith case were representative of the differences
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lines'7 4 version of "use" to support his interpretation of the statute.75 Justice Scalia concluded that the Sentencing Guidelines, which allow for
greater sentences when firearms are "brandished, displayed, or possessed" or "otherwise used,"" supported his
reading of "use" in § 924(c)(1),
7
to mean use of the firearm as a weapon.
In addition, the dissenters stated that because Congress' meaning was
unclear, the rule of lenity should apply.78 This rule applies in favor of a
defendant when a criminal statute is ambiguous and the issue is subject
to some doubt. 79 Thus, when a statute's language does not plainly and
unmistakably declare which conduct Congress has made criminal, a court
should choose a more lenient alternative." The majority refused to apply

between two philosophies of interpretation: textualism and strict constructionism. See
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW

23 & n.30 (1997) (using the Smith opinion to demonstrate the differences between textualism and strict constructionism). According to Scalia, a textualist should construe a law
"reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means." Id. Scalia, a self-proclaimed textualist,
dissented from the opinion because he felt that the phrase "uses a gun" could only mean
what guns are normally used for-as weapons. See id. at 23-24.
74. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1.
75. See Smith, 508 U.S. at 243 (Scalia, J.,dissenting) (citing SENTENCING
GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 2B3.1(b)(2)). Through the Crime Control Act of 1984, Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission, which later established the
guideline system.

See SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL

LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 149 (6th ed. 1995). The Guidelines "establish sentencing categories based on specific combinations of offense and offender characteristics." Id. Some
of the factors considered in sentencing are the nature and circumstances of the offense, the
history and characteristics of the defendant, and the need for the sentence. See id. (citing
18 U.S.C. § 3553 (1994) that outlines the factors judges should consider when imposing
sentences). For a discussion of the problems the Guidelines have caused, see Daniel J.
Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of the Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681 (1992) and Stephen J.Schulhofer, Assessing the
Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 833 (1992).
76. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 2B3.1(b)(2).

The Sentencing
Guidelines define "otherwise used" as conduct that does "not amount to the discharge of a
firearm but was more than brandishing, displaying, or possessing a firearm." Id. at § 1B1.1
cmt. n.1(g).
77. See Smith, 508 U.S. at 243 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
78. See id. at 246-47 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia writes that "[t]he rule of
lenity is almost as old as the common law itself" and that "is validated by sheer antiquity."
SCALIA, supra note 73, at 29 (citing SIR PETER BENSON MAXWELL, ON THE
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 239 (1875), which notes that the rule of lenity spans back
to English common law when over 100 capital offenses existed).
79. See Smith, 508 U.S. at 246-47 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Adamo Wrecking
Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 284-85 (1978)).
80. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971) (finding that when a statute's purpose and history is not clear, a narrower reading should apply).
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lenity principles because it found that Congress' intent was clear.81
The Smith case clarified only that using a firearm in exchange for drugs
is actionable under § 924(c)(1).8 Confusion remained in the circuit
courts of appeal, however, regarding the meaning of "use" under
§ 924(c)(1) in other circumstances." Although the Smith Court found
that "use" meant "to employ" a weapon, confusion existed with regard to
a possession requirement; 4 some courts of appeal held that the weapon
should merely be readily available to satisfy § 924(c)(1), 8 while other circuits found that standard insufficient.86 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bailey v. United States" to clarify the definition of "use" under
88
§ 924(c)(1) and to resolve this circuit court split.
The Bailey case consisted of two cases consolidated by the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which involved
convictions under the "use" provision of § 924(c)(1). 9 In the first case,
the police stopped Roland Bailey for a routine traffic violation and, upon
searching the car, found drugs and a loaded pistol. 9° Bailey was convicted
for possession with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm by a felon,
and using or carrying a firearm during a drug crime. 9' In the second case,
81. See Smith, 508 U.S. at 240-41.
82. See id. at 225.
83. See Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 142 (1995) (noting that the Court
granted certiorari because of the conflict between the circuits).
84. See Smith, 508 U.S. at 229; Clare, supra note 5, at 816 (noting the courts' difficulty
in determining what constitutes a "use" under the statute).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Hager, 969 F.2d 883, 889 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding that
when a firearm is part of a crime or the defendant has ready access to a firearm, the "use"
prong is satisfied); United States v. Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587, 597 (3d Cir. 1989)
(agreeing with the Second Circuit in United States v. Feliz-Cordero, 859 F.2d 250, 254 (2d
Cir. 1988), finding that a firearm is "used" when the circumstances suggest that the defendant strategically placed the firearm for possible use during a drug transaction).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Castro-Lara, 970 F.2d 976, 983 (1st Cir. 1992) (explaining that there must be some "facilitative nexus" between the activity and the firearm);
United States v. Torres-Rodriguez, 930 F.2d 1375, 1385 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that mere
possession constitutes a "use" under § 924(c)(1) when a firearm is used to protect the defendant or to intimidate others).
87. 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
88. See id. at 142. Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court. See
id. at 138.
89. See United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 108 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc), rev'd, 516
U.S. 137 (1995). The Court of Appeals consolidated the two cases and reheard them en
banc because of the inconsistency of the prior decisions in the cases. See id.; see also FED.
R. APP. P. 3(b) (giving the court authority to consolidate cases upon its own motion).
90. See Bailey, 516 U.S. at 139.
91. See United States v. Bailey, 995 F.2d 1113, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1993), affd en banc, 36
F.3d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1994), rev'd, 516 U.S. 137 (1995). Bailey was convicted for possession
with intent to distribute in excess of five grams of cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), pos-
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officers searched Candisha Robinson's apartment after an undercover
officer made two controlled narcotics purchases from her.92 During the
search, police found an unloaded gun and additional drugs in a locked
trunk in the bedroom closet. 93 Robinson was convicted, inter alia, of possession with intent to distribute a cocaine base, distribution of a cocaine
base, and using or carrying a firearm during a drug crime.94 Although
Bailey and Robinson were both convicted on all counts, including the
"use" and "carry" provisions of §-924(c)(1), 95 the court of appeals reviewed only their convictions on the "use" prong of the statute. 96
In its consideration of the consolidated cases, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia applied a "proximity and accessibility" test to determine if firearms had been "used." 97 The United
States Supreme Court stated, however, that this test did not provide a
court with guidance on evaluating if the weapon's involvement resulted
in more than mere possession under § 924(c)(1).18 To determine congressional intent, the Court looked to the dictionary definitions applied in the
Smith case two years earlier. • Again, the Court applied the ordinary
meaning of "use," selecting the definitions "to avail oneself of" or "to
session of a firearm by a felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and using or carrying a firearm
during a drug crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). See id.
92. See Bailey, 516 U.S. at 140.
93. See id.
94. See United States v. Robinson, 997 F.2d 884, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1993), affd en banc
sub nom., United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1994), rev'd, 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
Robinson was convicted of distributing a cocaine base under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(C), possessing with the intent to distribute more than five grams of a cocaine base
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(iii), committing drug offenses within 1000 feet
of a school under 21 U.S.C. § 860(a), maintaining a building to manufacture, store, distribute, or use a cocaine base under 21 U.S.C. § 856(a), and using or carrying a firearm during
a drug crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). See id.
95. See Bailey, 995 F.2d at 1115; United States v. Robinson, 779 F. Supp. 606, 606-07
(D.D.C. 1991), affd sub nom., United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106 (1994), rev'd, 516 U.S.

137 (1995).
96. See Bailey, 516 U.S. at 151. The Supreme Court did not consider whether Bailey
and Robinson's convictions satisfied by the "carry" provision because of the lower court's
focus on the "use" prong. See id.
. 97. See United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 113, 115 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc)
(adopting a "proximity and accessibility" test), rev'd, 516 U.S. 137 (1995). The court held
that "one uses a gun, i.e., avails oneself of a gun, and therefore violates the statute, whenever one puts or keeps the gun in a particular place from which one (or one's agent) can
gain access to it if and when needed to facilitate a drug crime." Id.
98. See Bailey, 516 U.S. at 143-44 (noting that the District of Columbia Circuit did not
require actual use, but criminalized "'simpl[e] possession with a floating intent to use"')
(quoting Bailey, 36 F.3d at 121 (Williams, J., dissenting)).
99. See id. at 145 (quoting United States v. Smith, 508 U.S. 223, 228-29 (1993)); see
also supra notes 54-82 (discussing the Court's interpretation of "use" in Smith).
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employ."'
The Court looked next to the textual context of § 924(c)(1)' O' as it did
in Smith. 0 2 The Court stated that Congress intended "use" and "carry"
to have distinct meanings, whereas the Government's broad interpretation of § 924(c)(1) incorrectly combined both of the terms.' °3 Based on
the rule of statutory construction that assumes Congress selects terms
with distinct and independent meanings, the Court assumed a narrow,
but active, interpretation of "use."'4 If the Court did not apply this rule,
the "carry" prong would be read out of the statute without a significant
role. O5
The Bailey Court then held that "use" under § 924(c)(1) means "active
employment."' 0'6 To avoid the confusion that followed the Smith decision, the Court went on to describe actionable activities under the "use"
prong of § 924(c)(1). 7 These activities include brandishing, displaying,
100. See Bailey, 516 U.S. at 145 (using the definitions from the Smith case). For a later
opinion that agreed with this definition of "use," see United States v. McFadden, 13 F.3d
463, 467 (1st Cir. 1994) (Breyer, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that "the ordinary meaning of
the words 'use' and 'carry'. . . connote activity beyond simple possession"). Also, Justice
Breyer seemed to uphold this position in the Muscarello opinion he authored by arguing
that the ordinary meaning of "carry" encompasses both conveying and possessing a firearm. See Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1913-14 (1998) (holding that a firearm is carried when it is conveyed and knowingly possessed).
101. See Bailey, 516 U.S. at 145 (discussing how statutory interpretation requires consideration of the word's "placement and purpose in the statutory scheme"); see also Brown
v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994) (noting that any interpretation of a word, plain or
complicated, depends on the context in which it is found).
102. See Smith, 508 U.S. at 233-37 (searching surrounding statutes for meaning); supra
notes 67-70 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's use of surrounding statutes for
context).
103. See Bailey, 516 U.S. at 145-46.
104. See id. at 146; see also Platt v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 99 U.S. 48, 58 (1878) (stating
that there is a presumption that a legislature does not use "superfluous words").
105. See Bailey, 516 U.S. at 146. Under the Court's interpretation of the two terms, a
firearm can be used but not necessarily carried and vice versa. See id. The Court looked
also to the statute's original version for guidance. See id. at 147 (citing the Gun Control
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 102, 82 Stat. 1213, 1223). Congress, the Court concluded, must have intended distinctive meanings because the "uses" and "carries" prongs
were previously separate provisions. See id. at 147-48. In the amended version where
"uses" and "carries" are combined, no evidence exists to show that Congress wanted the
two terms to overlap. See id.; Cunningham & Fillmore, supra note 31, at 1195-96 (noting
that Congress probably merged the sections for grammatical accuracy); Whiting, supra
note 15, at 685 n.21 (discussing the lack of legislative history as to why the sections were
combined).
106. See Bailey, 516 U.S. at 148. When the Government tried to reconcile this definition with the Court's holding in Smith, the Court stated that its interpretation in Smith also
adopted an "active employment" meaning. See id.
107. See id.
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bartering, or striking with a firearm.108 Ultimately, the Court held that
the prosecution must prove that the firearm was actively employed by
the defendant to obtain a conviction under § 924(c)(1).'0
With the meaning of "use" finally settled, the Supreme Court began to
review petitions for certiorari involving the "carry" prong of
§ 924(c)(1). l At that time, several circuit courts of appeal applied different standards to the "carry" prong.' 1 These divergent holdings on the
108. See id. The Court also concluded that a reference to a firearm or the "silent"
presence of a gun on a table could be actionable "uses" under § 924(c)(1). See id. Storage, however, of a firearm is not actionable, nor is placement for later use. See id. at 149.
109. See id. at 150. The Court found that the evidence against both Bailey and Robinson did not support either conviction for "use" of a firearm under § 924(c)(1) because they
did not "actively employ" the weapon. See id. at 150-51.
110. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's refusal to hear
cases on the proper interpretation of the statute).
111. In § 924(c)(1) "carry" cases, the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits defined "carrying" as transporting a weapon that is immediately accessible to the defendant. See
United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667, 676 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that a firearm within
reach during the commission of a drug offense is actionable under § 924(c)(1)); United
States v. Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3d 616, 623 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that a firearm must be
"immediately available for use" by either being on the defendant or within reach to convict under the "carrying" prong); United States v. Lopez, 100 F.3d 98, 101 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that a defendant can be convicted under § 924(c)(1) when he has transported a
firearm on or about his person and thus is immediately accessible); see also Broadbent,
supra note 15, at 24-25 (discussing the decisions in the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits).
The Fourth, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits used a completely different standard,
and held that a firearm transported in an automobile does not have to be easily accessible
to be carried for § 924(c)(1) purposes. See United States v. Mitchell, 104 F.3d 649, 653-54
(4th Cir. 1997) (holding that a firearm does not have to be easily accessible to be carried
under § 924(c)(1)); United States v. Molina, 102 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that
the firearm does not have to be within immediate reach to convict a defendant of "carrying" a firearm under § 924(c)(1)); United States v. Miller, 84 F.3d 1244, 1258 (10th Cir.
1996) (holding that the carrying prong is satisfied when a defendant exercises "dominion
and control" over a firearm while in transport); United States v. Chirinos, 112 F.3d 1089,
1095 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that the government needs only to prove that a defendant
transported a weapon in a vehicle to convict under § 924(c)(1)), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 701
(1998); see also Broadbent, supra note 15, at 25-26 (discussing the decisions in the Fourth,
Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits).
Meanwhile, the First Circuit adopted the pure transport theory, which permitted mere
transportation to convict a defendant for "carrying" under § 924(c)(1). See United States
v. Cleveland, 106 F.3d 1056, 1066 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding that a gun carried in the trunk of
a vehicle constituted "carrying"), affd sub nom. Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct.
1911 (1998); see also Broadbent, supra note 15, at 26 (noting the decision of the First Circuit). The Third and Eighth Circuits, however, did not address this issue conclusively. See
United States v. Eyer, 113 F.3d 470, 476 (3d Cir. 1997) (concluding that in this instance,
transporting an easily accessible firearm in a automobile could be carrying for § 924(c)(1)
purposes, but declining to comment on whether it could always be carrying); United States
v. Nelson, 109 F.3d 1323, 1325-26 (8th Cir. 1997) (assuming, but not deciding, that ready
availability is required to convict for "carrying" under § 924(c)(1)); see also Broadbent,
supra note 15, at 26-27 (noting the decisions of the Third and Eighth Circuits). See gener-
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meaning of "carry" under § 924(c)(1) prompted the Supreme Court to
grant certiorari in Muscarello v. United States."'
B.

"Carrying"a Firearmunder Muscarello

One of the Supreme Court's most recent ruling on the meaning of
§ 924(c)(1) resulted from a consolidation of two cases ..:United States v.
t
Muscarello"
and United States v. Cleveland."5 In both cases, the defendants were convicted of using and carrying a firearm during
and in rela6
tion to a drug trafficking crime in violation of § 924(c)(1).1
In Cleveland, Donald Cleveland and Enrique Gray-Santana placed
three guns inside a duffel bag and then put the bag in the trunk of a car
in order to rob their cocaine supplier in an upcoming exchange.' After
a lengthy investigation of Cleveland's supplier, the Drug Enforcement
Agency planned a raid on this exchange."' When Cleveland and the
supplier arrived at the meeting point, DEA officers handcuffed the men
and searched their vehicles.
The officers searched Cleveland's car,
found the bag that contained the guns along with rope and duct tape, and
then immediately arrested the two men and their supplier.120 The United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts sentenced Cleveland and Gray-Santana to 180 months imprisonment and sixty months of
supervised release. 21
Both Cleveland and Gray-Santana appealed their convictions under
§ 924(c)(1),
datedtheir claiming
• .. that
122the Supreme Court's decision in Bailey invalidated their convictions.
The United States Court of Appeals for the
ally Eme, supra note 15, at 16 (discussing the opportunities that the split in the federal circuits gives to attorneys to mold the law into what is best for their clients).
112. 522 U.S. 1023, 1023 (1997) (consolidating and granting certiorari in Muscarello v.
United States and United States v. Cleveland), affd, 118 S. Ct. 1911 (1998).
113. See id.
114. 106 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 1997), aff'd, 118 S. Ct. 1911 (1998).
115. 106 F.3d 1056 (1st Cir. 1997), affd sub nom. Muscarello v. United States, 118 S.
Ct. 1911 (1998).
116. See Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1914 (1998). Both defendants
were convicted under both prongs of § 924(c)(1) and of other narcotics offenses, including
possession, intent to distribute and conspiracy to distribute. See Cleveland, 106 F.3d at
1060; Muscarello, 106 F.3d at 637.
117. See Cleveland, 106 F.3d at 1059.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 1060.
122. See id. The Bailey decision came down from the Supreme Court shortly after the
district court convicted Cleveland under § 924(c)(1). See id. Cleveland and Gray-Santana
filed a motion for relief in light of the ruling, but the district court denied their motions.
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First Circuit applied the definition of "use" from Bailey to GraySantana's and Cleveland's appeal and held that the two men could not be
convicted under the "use" prong of § 924(c)(1). 123 The court of appeals
21
affirmed both convictions, however, under the "carry" prong of § 924(c)(1).1
In Muscarello, the companion case, Frank Muscarello pleaded guilty to
selling marijuana from his truck with a loaded firearm locked in the glove
compartment."' Like Cleveland and Gray-Santana, Muscarello appealed
his § 924(c)(1) conviction based on the recently decided Bailey case and
126
argued that he did not carry the weapon in relation to his drug crime.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, relying on
The court, however,
Bailey, overturned Muscarello's "use" c
affirmed Muscarello's conviction under the "carry" prong because Muscarello knew that the gun was in the vehicle.' The court also rejected
Muscarello's reasons for carrying the gun, holding that when a defendant
knowingly possesses a firearm in a vehicle and uses that vehicle for a
See id.; see also supra notes 7-8 (discussing post-conviction relief after the Bailey decision).
123. See Cleveland, 106 F.3d at 1065. The court of appeals applied the Supreme
Court's "active employment" interpretation, and then held that neither Gray-Santana nor
Cleveland actively employed the weapons because they remained in the trunk during the
drug interaction. See id.
124. See id. at 1068-69. The court of appeals explored the views of the other circuits
on the "carrying" prong and decided that instant accessibility was not required to satisfy
the statute. See id. at 1068; see also supra note 111 (discussing the divergent holdings of
the circuits on the "carry" prong). The court further held that its decision is consistent
with its previous holding that a firearm could be "carried" in a boat for § 924(c)(1) purposes. See Cleveland, 106 F.3d at 1065 (citing United States v. Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d
1149, 1154 (1st Cir. 1996)).
125. See United States v. Muscarello, 106 F.3d 636, 637 (5th Cir. 1997), affd, 118 S. Ct.
1911 (1998).
126. See id. at 637-38; see also Cleveland, 106 F.3d at 1060. Muscarello argued that the
gun had been in the glove compartment for a long period of time and that he did not make
a conscious decision to carry the gun in relation to the drug crime. See Muscarello, 106
F.3d at 637. In addition, he stated that, as a bailiff with the Sheriff's office, he carried the
gun in relation to his job. See id. at 637-38. The court of appeals rejected this argument
and asserted that the statute required only that Muscarello knowingly possessed the firearm. See id. at 638-39.
Two other circuits followed this same rule. See United States v. Brantley, 68 F.3d 1283,
1289-90 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding that the statute does not require proof that the defendant
knew about the features of the weapon if the defendant knew he possessed a firearm);
United States v. Lopez, 37 F.3d 565, 571-72 (9th Cir. 1994) (asserting that the defendant's
stated purpose for carrying the weapon was irrelevant), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1277 (1999).
127. See Muscarello, 106 F.3d at 638-39. The court of appeals applied the "active employment" interpretation of "use" and found that Muscarello did not "use" the firearm
because it remained in the glove compartment during the drug crime. See id.
128. See id. at 639. In a previous decision, the Fifth Circuit noted that "the means of
carrying is the vehicle itself." Id. (quoting United States v. Pineda-Ortuno, 952 F.2d 98,
104 (5th Cir. 1992), which held that, for § 924(c) purposes, the vehicle is the mechanism for
carrying).
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drug trafficking crime, he is "carrying" a firearm for § 924(c)(1) pur129
poses.
1. The Majority Opinion:A Broad Interpretationof the "Carry"
Prong
The Supreme Court consolidated Muscarello and Cleveland's appeals,
and then granted certiorari to determine if "carrying" firearms in a vehicle is a chargeable offense under § 924(c)(1).'3 The Court, in a five-tofour decision authored by Justice Breyer,"' concluded that possessing a
firearm in a2 vehicle falls within the purview of the "carry" prong of
§ 924(c)(1).11

As it did in the Smith and Bailey cases, the Court looked first to the
statute's language and the ordinary, natural meaning of the word
"carry."' 33 The Court examined many sources to find the ordinary
meaning of "carry," including dictionaries, literature, newspapers, and
even the Bible.3 The Court concluded that "carry" means "to convey,"
whether by car, hand, or boat.'
The Court explored next the legislative history behind § 924(c)(1) to
determine whether Congress intended "carry" to be construed in its ordinary sense, or if it intended the term to be interpreted in a more limited manner."' The majority used the statements of the statute's legisla129. See id.
130. See Muscarello v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 1911, 1914 (1998).
131. See id. at 1913. Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas joined Justice
Breyer's majority opinion. See id. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia and Souter, dissented. See id. at 1920.
132. See id. at 1914.
133. See id. at 1914-16; Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144-45 (1995) (starting
the analysis of "use" by examining the plain meaning of the word); Smith v. United States,
508 U.S. 223, 228-29 (1993) (same).
134. See Muscarello, 118 S.Ct. at 1914-16 (exploring the various meanings for "carry"
found in these different sources). The majority found that the Bible used the word carry
to mean conveyance in a vehicle. See id. at 1914 (citing 2 Kings 9:28 (King James) ("'[H]is
servants carried him in a chariot to Jerusalem'...") and Isaiah 30:6 (King James) ("'[TJhey
will carry their riches upon the shoulders of young asses'...")).
135. See id. at 1915-16 (finding the meaning of "carry" can include carrying in a car
"whether one carries a gun, a suitcase, or a banana"). On previous occasions, the Court
described "carrying" drugs in a car in a manner that is consistent with the interpretation in
Muscarello. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 572-73 (1991) (allowing police
searches of containers where there is probable cause to believe a suspect is "carrying
marijuana in a bag in his car's trunk"); Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 249 (1991) (finding
that when police have permission to search a vehicle because they believe a suspect is carrying narcotics in his car, they may also search open containers inside the vehicle).
136. See Muscarello, 118 S.Ct. at 1916. Courts generally look to the legislative history
of a statute to gather evidence of Congress' intent in enacting the statute. See Brock v.
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tive sponsor to show that Congress created § 924(c)(1)'s mandatory
minimum sentence to convince the criminal to leave his gun at home.'37
After examining the statements, the Court did not find any "significant
indication" that Congress sought to limit "carry" to require carrying on
the person.'38
The petitioners argued that the Court should take the same approach
to construing terms that it did in Bailey, and thus construe "carry" narrowly.139 In doing so, both terms in the statute, "use" and "carry," would
retain their independent meanings.'9 The majority disagreed, however,
Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 263 (1986) (finding that statements of individual legislators,
when consistent with the language of the statute, are helpful in determining congressional
intent); County of Washington, Or. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 182 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (noting that it is "well settled that the legislative history of a statute is a useful
guide to the intent of Congress"). But see Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S.
597, 617 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that legislative history is an unreliable
source of congressional intent).
Justice Scalia strongly denounces the relatively new use of legislative history in interpreting statutes. See SCALIA, supra note 73, at 29-37 (outlining Scalia's views on the
overwhelming use of legislative history in recent years). His textualist theory of interpretation views "the objective indication of the words" as the most reliable source of the statute's meaning. See id. at 29. He argues that the legal community has come to rely on legislative history and routinely "make[s] no distinction between words in the text of a statute
and words in its legislative history." Id. at 31. Ultimately, Justice Scalia urges the legal
community, both judges and lawyers, to end the routine use of legislative history. See id.
at 36. For more information on this subject, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 48-49 (1994) (discussing the power of courts to revise and
interpret statutes); Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
COLUM. L. REv. 527, 538 (1947) (quoting a letter from Justice Holmes, which stated that,
as a judge, he wanted only to know what the statute's words meant and did not care about
the congressional intent behind the term); Arthur W. Phelps, FactorsInfluencing Judges in
Interpreting Statutes, 3 VAND. L. REv. 456, 469 (1950) (arguing that statutes should be interpreted according to the needs and goals of modern society, as well as on the basis of
legislative history).
137. See Muscarello, 118 S. Ct. at 1916 (citing 114 CONG. REC. 22,231 (1968) (statement of Rep. Poff)). The Court noted also that other legislators made similar remarks.
See id. (citing 114 CONG. REc. 22,244 (1968) (statement of Rep. Randall) ("Of course,
what we are trying to do by these penalties is to persuade the criminal to leave his gun at
home.") and 114 CONG. REC. 22,236 (1968) (statement of Rep. Meskill) ("We are concerned.., with having the criminal leave his gun at home.")).
138. See id. at 1917. The majority found that none of the legislators defined the scope
of "carry," and therefore the term should not be limited to apply solely to instances where
the gun was on the person. See id. The petitioners argued that Congress would have used
the word "transport," not "carry," if it intended the statute to apply to vehicles. See id.
Upon examining Congress' use of the two words, the Court concluded that "transport" is a
broad category that encompasses "carry." See id. The majority found that "carry" is a
more limited term and "implies personal agency and some degree of possession" whereas
"transport" is not so limited. See id. at 1917-18.
139. See id. at 1918; Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995) (assuming that
Congress intended each word to have a distinct meaning).
140. See Muscarello, 118 S. Ct. at 1918. The petitioners argued that a broad interpreta-
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and further stated that its broader interpretation of "carry" did not consume the "use" prong.141 The Court allowed the terms to retain independent meanings because carrying
a gun in a car does not always in•
142
volve the gun's active employment.
The majority found that after
interpreting "use" narrowly in Bailey, the statute's basic purpose would
be defeated by interpreting "carry" narrowly.14 Limiting the definition
of "carry" to carrying on the person, would leave "a gap in coverage"
unintended by Congress' 44
Additionally, the petitioners argued that the Court should limit the
scope of "carry" to instances in which the firearm was immediately accessible, as several of the courts of appeal had done.'4 ' The Court, however,
found that a criminal could still "carry" a gun, regardless of whether the
gun was immediately accessible.'
Based on the legislative history of
§ 924(c)(1) and the generally accepted meaning of the word "carry," the
majority held that the defendants' conduct fell within the scope of the
statute.'47
Finally, the majority held that despite a broad interpretation, the
"during and in relation to" clause of the statute limited the statute's application to the harms that Congress intended. ' The Court viewed the
tion of "carry" would envelope the term "use." See id.
141. See id.
142. See id.; Bailey, 516 U.S. at 143. The Court acknowledged also in Bailey that a
firearm can be carried without being used and vice versa. See Bailey, 516 U.S. at 146.
143. See Muscarello, 118 S. Ct. at 1918. The majority found that it could not construe
both the "use" and "carry" prongs narrowly because doing so would undercut the statute's
purpose of deterring gun violence. See id. Under the Court's interpretation, both words
retain separate meanings, and Congress' purpose is fulfilled. See id.
144. See id. Such a limited interpretation would eliminate carrying in a car and the
Court insisted that Congress did not intend to permit that limitation. See id.
145. See id. Some courts of appeal had held that § 924(c)(1) applied only when the
firearm was immediately accessible. See supra note 111 (discussing the circuits that required immediate accessibility); e.g., United States v. Foster, 133 F.3d 704, 708 (9th Cir.
1998) (holding that a defendant "carries" a firearm for § 924(c)(1) purposes only when it is
"on or about his or her person" and immediately accessible), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 32 (1998)
(memorandum decision). The petitioners argued that the majority's interpretation could
be extended to passengers of mass transit vehicles, such as buses, who placed a firearm in
checked luggage. See Muscarello, 118 S. Ct. at 1918. The Court, however, rejected this
argument, and relied on a House debate in which legislators had both praised and criticized the use of "carry" to prove that the term "carries" has a broader scope. See id.
146. See Muscarello, 118 S. Ct. at 1919.
147. See id. at 1919-20.
148. See id.; see also United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538, 539 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting
that Congress added the "in relation to" clause to address concerns that a person could be
charged under § 924(c)(1) for committing an unrelated crime while possessing a firearm);
S. REP. No. 98-225, at 314 n.10 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3492 (finding
that the "in relation to" clause would preclude the application of the statute when the gun
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clause as confining the application of the statute to times when a defen149
dant both "carries" a gun and participates in a drug trafficking crime.
The majority reasoned that the "during and in relation to" clause supported its interpretation of the "carry" prong because a weapon could be
"carried" in a vehicle "during" a crime without being on the person.15
The Court added that the "during and in relation to" limitation would
prevent any possible misuse of the statute. 5 ' The clause eliminates the
possibility that the statute will be misused by being applied to such situations where, for example, guns were carried during a fight or checked in
luggage." 2
2. The Dissent: Arguingfor a Limited Interpretationof the "Carry"
Prong
The dissenters in Muscarello disagreed with the majority's broad interpretation of the word "carry" and sought to confine the phrase to a more
limited interpretation.'53 The phrase "carries a firearm," Justice Ginsburg argued, requires more than a firearm's mere presence in a vehicle. 54
Instead, for § 924(c) purposes, this term should be construed as bearing
arms "in such manner as to be ready for use as a weapon."' 55
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg noted that her interpretation of § 924(c)(1)
respects the Sentencing Guidelines and punishes criminal behavior accordingly."' Justice Ginsburg added that the statute would still accomplayed no part in the crime).
149. See Muscarello, 118 S. Ct. at 1918-19.
150. See id. at 1919. The Court argued that whether a gun is carried in a car's trunk or
glove compartment is irrelevant if the weapon is carried "during and in relation to" the
drug crime. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 1918; S. REP. No. 98-225, at 314 n.10, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3492 (giving the example of a gun carried during a barroom fight as a situation in which
the statute would not apply).
153. See Muscarello, 118 S. Ct. at 1920 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissenters conceded that "carry" could be defined in many ways, including carrying in a vehicle. See id.
They did not find that to be the proper interpretation when applied to § 924(c), however,
because of the surrounding context in the statute. See id. at 1923. Justice Ginsburg argued
that Congress would have inserted the word "transport" if it intended the meaning that
the majority found. See id. at 1923-24. Justices Scalia and Souter continued their fight
with the majority over the interpretation of § 924(c) from the dissent in the Smith decision
five years earlier. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 241 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia's disagreement
with the method of statutory construction in Smith).
154. See Muscarello, 118 S.Ct. at 1920 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
155. Id.
156. See id. at 1920-21. Under the Sentencing Guidelines System, Muscarello would
only receive an additional four-month sentence.
See id.; see also SENTENCING
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plish Congress' intent without resorting to the unnecessary broad application that the majority gave the word "carry."' 57 The dissenters and the
majority agreed that an enhanced punishment should apply; however,
they disagreed on the source for the punishment, § 924(c) or the Sentencing Guidelines."" Under either the Guidelines System or § 924(c)(1),
drug traffickers would receive an enhanced sentence.'9 Justice Ginsburg
argued that the sentence enhancement available under the Sentencing
Guidelines should apply to the case at hand because the possession of the
weapon was not clearly connected with the crime. 16° The dissenters imsupra note 1, § 2D1.1(a)(3) (assigning Muscarello's offense as a level 12 out
of 42 for distribution of 3.6 kilograms of marijuana). The Sentencing Guidelines carry out
"a major congressional effort to create a fairly sophisticated ... system that distinguishes
among different kinds of criminal behavior and punishes accordingly." United States v.
McFadden, 13 F.3d 463, 467-68 (1st Cir. 1994) (Breyer, C.J., dissenting).
While seemingly in support of mandatory minimum sentences in Muscarello, Justice
Breyer denounced mandatory minimum sentences and supported the Sentencing Guidelines when he was the Chief Judge of the First Circuit. See id. at 468 (describing mandatory minimum penalties as an "ad hoc deviation" from general sentencing policy); see also
Muscarello, 118 S.Ct. at 1919 (upholding a § 924(c) conviction for carrying a firearm in an
automobile). In McFadden, Justice Breyer dissented against the application of § 924(c)(1)
and argued for the application of the Guidelines to determine the defendant's sentence.
See McFadden, 13 F.3d at 467-68 (Breyer, C.J., dissenting). Justice Breyer may have developed an affinity for the Sentencing Guidelines because he was one of the initial commissioners on the United States Sentencing Commission before his appointment to the
Supreme Court. See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 84 (1996) (arguing that
the Sentencing Commission was unsuccessful because a number of the initial commissioners aspired for higher offices). For more information on Justice Breyer's views on the Sentencing Guidelines, see Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key
Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1988) reprintedin sub nom.
The Key Compromises of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, in SENTENCING, JUDICIAL
DISCRETION AND TRAINING 105 (Colin Munro & Martin Wasik eds., 1992).
157. See Muscarello, 118 S.Ct. at 1921 & n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). According to
Justice Ginsburg, it was reasonable for Congress to provide mandatory sentences for lifethreatening situations when a firearm is in or near the defendant's hand and to provide a
more flexible standard, like the Sentencing Guidelines, for less threatening situations, such
as when a firearm is anywhere in the defendant's vehicle. See id. at 1922.
158. See id. at 1921 ("The question that divides the Court concerns the proper reference for enhancement in the cases at hand, the Guidelines or § 924(c)(1).").
159. See id. at 1921. The Sentencing Guidelines establish sentencing ranges that
judges must consider when they sentence defendants. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG &
DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1164 (5th ed. 1996) (discussing
the blending of the Sentencing Guidelines and mandatory minimum sentences). By enacting mandatory minimum sentences such as § 924(c)(1), Congress has required mandatory minimums to be merged into the structure of the Guidelines. See SENTENCING
GUIDELINES, supra note 1, §5G1.1(b); SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra, at 1164. If the
Guidelines calculation for a crime is lower than the mandatory minimum penalty, the
mandatory sentence will prevail. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, §5G1.1(b);
see also SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra, at 1165 (citing United States v. Stoneking, 60 F.3d
399, 402 (8th Cir. 1995)).
160. See Muscarello, 118 S.Ct. at 1920-21 & n.1 (citing Justice Breyer's language in
GUIDELINES,
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plicitly maintained that applying the Guidelines System would serve congressional intent better than §924(c)(1)
because these penalties are "tai'61
lored to the seriousness of the crime. 1
Justice Ginsburg disputed also the majority's use of popular definitions
to justify its interpretation of § 924(c)(1). 62 Questioning the accuracy of
the majority's search, she argued that dictionaries, press clippings, and
the Bible should not be held out as the ultimate interpretations of congressional intent.16 ' Although Justice Ginsburg conceded that "carrying"
is defined as carrying in a car about one-third of the time, she concluded
that 164
the most familiar meaning of "carry" was to wear or bear on the person. Justice Ginsburg found, in light of the fact that "carry" conveys so
many meanings, ordinary definitions were not a reliable indicator of con-

United States v. McFadden, 13 F.3d 463, 466-68 (1st Cir. 1994) (Breyer, C.J., dissenting)).
161. See id. at 1921 (quoting McFadden, 13 F.3d at 466 (Breyer, C.J., dissenting)).
Although all fifty states and the federal court system have implemented mandatory
minimum sentences and sentencing guidelines, both types of sentencing policies have been
criticized as ineffective in achieving deterrence of crime and retribution. See JEFFERY T.
ULMER, SOCIAL WORLDS OF SENTENCING: COURT COMMUNITIES UNDER SENTENCING

GUIDELINES 1 (1997). In theory, sentencing guidelines are presumed to preserve judicial

discretion in adjusting sentences to fit individual defendants or unusual situations. See id.
at 2. Similarly, mandatory minimums have been blamed for removing local court discretion in sentencing. See TONRY, supra note 156, at 135. Many prosecutors and judges feel
that mandatory penalties impose sentences that are too harsh and ultimately do not have a
powerful deterrence effect. See id.
Another criticism concerns the fact that the use of sentencing guidelines has led to disparities in sentencing in four major areas: race, gender, age, and mode of conviction. See
id. at 7-10; see also LOIS G. FORER, A RAGE TO PUNISH: THE UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES OF MANDATORY SENTENCING 60 (1994) (relating the author's disapproval of mandatory penalties and sentencing guidelines because of the disparities caused
by factors such as race, gender, education, and mental conditions).
One commentator suggested four changes to mandatory minimum penalties that may
alleviate these problems. See TONRY, supra note 156, at 135-36. First, the penalties for
particularly serious crimes should be presumptive, not mandatory, so that judges can avoid
any unintended consequences. See id. at 135. Second, legislators should add "sunset provisions" to any new sentencing laws so that "laws passed in the passion of the moment will
not endure for decades." Id. at 136. Third, long prison sentences should be applied only
to severe crimes like murder, aggravated rape, or armed robbery, and not to "minor
crimes" concerning marginal amounts of narcotics. See id. Finally, correctional officers
should be allowed to reevaluate the release dates of any offender receiving a sentence of
more than five or ten years. See id. For a interesting discussion on a former judge's disgust with mandatory penalties, sentencing guidelines, and capital punishment, see FORER,
supra.
162. See Muscarello, 118 S.Ct. at 1921-22 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
163. See id.
164. See id. at 1921 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY). To "carry arms or weapons"
is defined as "[tlo wear, bear, or carry ...upon the person or in the clothing or in a
pocket, for the purpose ... of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a
case of conflict with another person." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (5th ed. 1979).
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165

gressional intent.
Additionally, the dissenters questioned the Court's interpretation of
the other statutes surrounding § 924(c)(1).' 66 Justice Ginsburg noted that
Congress did not always follow the carry/transport distinction that the
majority relied on. 167 Giving an "on the person" limitation to "carry" is,
according to the dissent, compatible with the other firearm statutes surrounding § 924(c)(1).'6 Thus, based on the manner in which the surrounding sections used the word "carry," the dissenters found that the
majority's interpretation of § 924(c)(1) was overly broad.169
Due to the ambiguity surrounding § 924(c)(1) and Congress' intent,
the dissenters argued for the application of the rule of lenity.170 According to the rule, when a statute is not decisively clear, the defendants to
whom the statute is to be applied should receive the benefit of the ambiguity.17' The majority, on the other hand, refused to apply the rule because its decision was "based on much more than a 'guess as to what
Congress intended.", 172 Ultimately, the dissenters argued that Congress
has a duty to impose stricter penalties in clear and definite language.
III. THE ENACTMENT OF S. 191
A. Legislative History
In November of 1998, Congress amended § 924(c) for the sixth time
since the statute's original enactment in 1968 by adding another provision to the original "uses or carries" language.
This provision broadened § 924(c)'s scope by mandating a five year penalty to those who possess a firearm in order to further a crime of violence or a drug trafficking

165. See Muscarello, 118 S. Ct. at 1922 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
166. See id. at 1923-24.
167. See id. at 1923 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 925(a)(2)(B), 926A (1994), which use "transport" instead of "carry," to imply personal agency and some degree of possession).
168. See id. at 1923-24 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
169. See id. at 1924.
170. See id. The sharp division in the Court indicated also that "the 'issue [was] subject to some doubt."' Id. (quoting Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275,
284-85 (1978)).
171. See id.
172. See id. at 1919 (quoting United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 499 (1997)). The
Court, believing that most statutes are ambiguous to some degree, held that the existence
of some ambiguity in a statute is not enough to trigger the application of the rule. See id.
173. See id. at 1925 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
174. See Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, § 1(a)(1), 112 Stat. 3469.
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crime."' Also, Congress imposed more severe penalties on those defendants that brandish or discharge a firearm while committing such a
crime."' In addition, the amendment increased the sentence for a second
or subsequent conviction under the statute from twenty, to twenty-five
177
years.
Before this recent amendment, several members of Congress attempted unsuccessfully to amend § 924(c)(1) to include a possession
standard. 17 Most of the bills and amendments, however, died in committee or during floor debate.179 Several of these amendments were direct
reactions to the Supreme Court's Bailey decision, which interpreted
175. See id. The "during and in relation to" clause still'modifies the "uses and carries"
language while the new "in furtherance of any such crime" language now modifies the
"possesses" provision. See id.
176. See id. If the firearm is brandished, the mandatory penalty is seven years. See id.
If the firearm is discharged, the mandatory sentence is ten years. See id. Congress defined
brandish as "to display all or part of the firearm, or otherwise make the presence of the
firearm known to another person, in order to intimidate that person, regardless of whether
the firearm is directly visible to that person." Id. § 1(a)(2).
177. See id. § 1(a)(1).
178. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. 13,079 (1989) (providing a section-by-section analysis
of S. 1225). The stated goal of the amendment was "to broaden the prohibitions in 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)... to reach persons who have a firearm or explosive available during
the commission of certain crimes, even if the firearm is not carried or used." Id. For more
information on these congressional attempts, see Cunningham & Fillmore, supra note 31,
at 1198-1203 (examining the past attempts to add a possession standard to the statute).
In 1990, Senator Gramm succeeded in adding an amendment to a crime bill that replaced "uses or carries" with "possesses" and defined possession as
(i) in the case of a crime of violence, the person touches a firearm.., at any time
during the commission of the crime; and
(ii) in the case of a drug trafficking crime, the person has a firearm readily available at the scene of the crime during the commission of the crime.
S. 1970, 101st Cong. § 301 (1990); 136 CONG. REC. S8993 (daily ed. June 28, 1990) (adding
the Gramm Amendment to S. 1970). The proposal also raised the minimum sentence to
ten years, added a twenty year sentence to whoever "discharges a firearm with intent to
injure," and imposed the death penalty or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole if the weapon's discharge resulted in someone's demise. See id. The Gramm
Amendment, however, did not appear in the final bill as it was enacted. See Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1101, 104 Stat. 4789, 4829. Instead, a shortened
version of the bill was enacted and the conference committee did not issue a report. See
136 CONG. REC. S17,600 (daily ed. Oct. 27,1990) (statement of Sen. Biden); Cunningham
& Fillmore, supra note 31, at 1200 n.19. The bill may have been abandoned because there
was considerable resistance to the exorbitant use of mandatory sentences and to the death
penalty provision. See id. (trying to explain the absence of the amendment); see also 136
CONG. REC. S8998 (daily ed. June 28, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (criticizing the
constant use of mandatory sentencing provisions); 136 CONG. REC. S9021 (daily ed. June
28, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kerry) (opposing the insertion of the death penalty provision).
179. See Cunningham & Fillmore, supra note 31, at 1200-02 (referencing the loss of
several bills to committee or conference).
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to mean active employment. 80
January 9, 1997, Representative Myrick introduced H.R. 424, the
recent amendment, which was an amendment that replaced the
or carries" language of § 924(c)(1) with language punishing possessing, brandishing, or discharging a firearm during or in relation to a
crime. 8" Several other members joined Rep. Myrick in sponsoring the
bill, 182 and the House passed the bill on February 24, 1998.183 The report
accompanying the bill explained that the amendment's purpose was to
clarify the congressional intent behind § 924(c) and to reverse "the restrictive effect of the Bailey decision."'.
A few weeks later, on January 22, 1997, Senator Helms introduced a
companion bill in the Senate, S.191, which added the possession standard while keeping the "uses or carries" language.'85 Several Senators
joined Senator Helms in co-sponsoring the bill. ' In the Senate Judiciary
"use"
On
most
"uses

180. See 144 CONG. REC. S12,670 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1998) (statement of Sen.
DeWine); 144 CONG. REC. H10,030 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1998) (statement of Rep. McCollum); 142 CONG. REC. S1976 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1996) (statement of Sen. Helms) (introducing S.1612 in response to "the tragic result of an unfortunate and unwise Supreme
Court decision").
181. See H.R. 424, 105th Cong. § 1 (1997); 143 CONG. REC. H153 (daily ed. Jan. 9,
1997).
182. See 143 CONG. REC. H7008 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1997) (Rep. Kelly joining as a cosponsor to the bill); 143 CONG. REC. H5826 (daily ed. July 25, 1997) (Rep. Wexler joining
as a co-sponsor to the bill); 143 CONG. REC. H1542 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1997) (Rep. Ehrlich
and Rep. Petri joining as co-sponsors to the bill); 143 CONG. REC. H245 (daily ed. Jan. 21,
1997) (Rep. Talent and Rep. Foley joining as co-sponsors to the bill).
Some members opposed the bill, however, because of the "outrageous mandatory
minimum penalties" that the bill prescribed. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. H10,330 (daily ed.
Oct. 9, 1998) (statement of Rep. Scott). Rep. Scott felt that the penalties under the
amendment were too severe when compared with other crimes. See id. He compared the
seven year penalty for brandishing a gun with the five year penalty for voluntary manslaughter. See id. He saw the bill as crime legislation "run amok" with these types of penalties. See id.
183. See 144 CONG. REC. H535-36 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1998). The bill passed by a vote
of 350 to 59. See id. Several members strongly supported the passage of the bill as an effective tool against the increase in gun-related violence. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. H53435 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1998) (statement of Rep. Crane and Rep. Cunningham); see also,
e.g., 144 CONG. REC. E224 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1998) (statement of the Hon. Jon Christensen).
184. H.R. REP. No. 105-344, at 6 (1997).
185. See S.191,105th Cong. § 1 (1997); 143 CONG. REC. S633 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1997).
Senators DeWine, Hatch, Nickles, Abraham, and Faircloth joined Senator Helms in introducing the bill. See id.
186. See 143 CONG. REC. S11,779 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1997) (Sen. Smith joining as a cosponsor); 143 CONG. REC. S5264 (daily ed. June 3, 1997) (Sen. Hutchinson joining); 143
CONG. REC. S4246 (daily ed. May 8, 1997) (Senators Sessions and Shelby joining as cosponsors of the bill); 143 CONG. REC. S4010 (daily ed. May 6, 1997) (Senators Thurmond,
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Committee hearing regarding the bill, Senator Helms stated that Congress was "morally obliged" to fix the "latest blunder" made by the Supreme Court in the Bailey case.'87 Although the Senate first passed the
bill in late 1997, the House and Senate did not sign the current version of
the bill until one year later because the House added an amendment to
the bill.' 8
The "Bailey Fix Act" resulted in enhanced penalties for criminal offenders. 9 Members of Congress felt that the Bailey decision "dealt a serious blow to law enforcement" '9° as well as changed the Justice Department's previous policy of applying the "use" prong to defendants whose
firearms further their criminal endeavors.' 9' The Supreme Court's interpretation of the "use" prong limited the statute's application to cases
when the defendant actively discharged or brandished his weapon.'92 The
amendment expands the statute's scope to apply also in those instances
when a criminal possesses a firearm in furtherance of a felony.'9
B.

The Possession Standard

Congress added the term "possession" to §924(c)(1) in order to
broaden the application of the statute beyond the Supreme Court's prior

Stevens, and Ashcroft joining); 143 CONG. REC. S3851 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (Sen. Kyl
joining as a co-sponsor); 143 CONG. REC. S3803 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1997) (Sen. Enzi joining as a co-sponsor of the bill); 143 CONG. REC. S2285 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1997) (Sen.
Hagel joining); 143 CONG. REC. S1573 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1997) (Sen. Inhofe joining as a
co-sponsor of the bill).
187. See Criminal Use of Guns: Hearing on S.191 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 3 (1997) (statement of Sen. Helms). Thomas G. Hungar also testified
in the Committee hearing that S.191 was "a measured response to the problems created
by the Bailey decision." Id. at 34, 38. Mr. Hungar represented the United States before
the Supreme Court in the Smith case. See id. at 34.
188. See 144 CONG. REC. H10,329 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1998) (statement of Rep. McCollum). The Senate passed S. 191 on November 13, 1997. See id. On October 9, 1998, the
House passed S.191 with an amendment. See id. at 10,331. The Senate agreed to the
House amendment on October 15, 1998. See 144 CONG. REC. S12,631 (daily ed. Oct. 15,
1998) (giving unanimous consent to the House amendment). On November 12, 1998, both
the House and the Senate signed the current version of the bill. See 144 CONG. REC.
H11,707 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 1998); 144 CONG. REC. S12,983 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 1998).
189. See 144 CONG. REC. S12,670 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1998) (statement of Sen.
DeWine); 144 CONG. REC. H10,329 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1998) (statement of Rep. McCollum).
190. 144 CONG. REC. S12,670 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1998) (statement of Sen. DeWine).
191. See 144 CONG. REC. H10,330 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1998) (statement of Rep. McCollum).
192. See Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143 (1995) (holding that § 924(c)(1) requires sufficient evidence to show active employment of a firearm).
193. See Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, § 1(a)(1), 112 Stat. 3469.
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interpretation of the "use" prong.9 4 In essence, however, the Supreme
Court's broad interpretation of the "carry" prong in Muscarello already

extended
the statute to permit punishment for mere possession of a fire195
arm. Yet, in 'enacting S. 191, Congress never discussed the Muscarello
decision or the impact the decision had on the statute. 196
Possibly, Congress did not discuss the Muscarello decision because the
utilization of the possession standard was not a novel idea in § 924(c) jurisprudence."" Before the recent amendment, the circuit courts of appeal
frequently applied differing theories of possession to the statute. 198 The
first of these theories is the fortress theory of possession, which convicts

defendants under § 924(c) when firearms and narcotics are found on the
premises and the firearm is under the control of the defendant.'9 The
fortress theory is founded on the premise that when numerous firearms
are found in a "drug fortress," the guns are used or carried in relation to
a drug trafficking crime because the guns were present to protect the
drug traffickers 2 ° In essence, the firearms helped facilitate the commission of the crime because of the increased likelihood of successful completion of the crime. 20' The present version of the statute makes a convic194. See H.R. REP. No. 105-344, at 6 (1997); Bailey, 516 U.S. at 143 (finding that a defendant must actively employ a firearm to be convicted under the "use" provision of
§ 924(c)(1)).
195. See Muscarello, 118 S. Ct. at 1913-14 (refusing to limit the interpretation of "carrying" a firearm to weapons on the person and instead holding that when a defendant
knowingly possesses firearms in a vehicle, he is "carrying" for § 924(c)(1) purposes).
196. Cf H.R. REP. No. 105-344, at 6 (stating that the amendment is a direct reaction
to the Bailey decision); S. REP. No. 98-225, at 312-13, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3490-91 (explaining that Congress devised the amendment to deal with the problems
caused by the Supreme Court's decisions in Simpson and Busic).
197. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (noting the application of a possession
standard in the lower courts).
198. See Moore, supra note 43, at 183-93 (outlining the divergent holdings in the circuits based on differing theories of possession); infra notes 199-207 (discussing the varying
circuit court opinions).
199. See, e.g., United States v. Critton, 43 F.3d 1089, 1096-97 (6th Cir. 1995) (discussing
the fortress theory and holding that weapons are used or carried, for § 924(c) purposes,
when it reasonably appears that weapons were in the defendant's actual or constructive
possession and were used to protect drugs); United States v. McFadden, 13 F.3d 463, 465
(1st Cir. 1994) (finding that the presence of a firearm for protection created a drug fortress); United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1989) (recognizing the fortress
theory where firearms were placed for ready use); United States v. Matra, 841 F.2d 837,
843 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding that firearms are used or carried "during and in relation to"
the drug crime when they are intended to protect drugs or otherwise facilitate the crime).
200. See Riordan, supra note 5, at 54 (explaining the fortress theory); Kesselman, supra note 9, at 530-31 (same).
201. See Riordan, supra note 5, at 54 (arguing that the large amount of weapons and
drugs usually found in fortress-type cases allows a court to infer that the firearms helped
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tion under the fortress theory much simpler.
Previously, courts also applied the emboldening theory of possession
to § 924(c), which requires proof that a nearby firearm emboldened the
defendant to commit the drug trafficking crime.'O Unlike the fortress
theory, the firearm does not need to be near the narcotics; the mere
presence of a firearm is enough proof under the emboldening theory.'O
Congress designed the latest amendment to apply to instances when a
defendant was emboldened by the presence of a firearm.20
Under the last theory of possession, several federal courts of appeal
held that the gun must be immediately accessible to the defendant in order to satisfy the carry requirement of § 924(c).0 5 According to the Supreme Court's decision in Muscarello, however, applying the immediate
accessibility test to the "uses or carries" provisions of the statute ultimately undermines the congressional intent behind the statute.2 Under
the immediate accessibility test and the Supreme Court's holding in Bailey, a defendant who passively stores a firearm for later use cannot be
considered either "using" or "carrying" a firearm for § 924(c) purposes.207
The effect of the recent amendment on the immediate accessibility test
remains to be seen because the amendment requires a firearm to be possessed "in furtherance of" a crime.208 Seemingly, the Committee on the
facilitate the crime).
202. See, e.g., United States v. Salazar, 66 F.3d 723, 728 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding that
§ 924(c)(1) is satisfied if a defendant used or carried a firearm to embolden himself, protect himself, or intimidate others); United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538, 540 (9th Cir.
1985) (holding that there is a § 924(c)(1) violation if the circumstances show that the firearm had a role in the crime by emboldening the defendant). For more information on the
cases applying the emboldening theory, see Kesselman, supra note 9, at 534.
203. See Clare, supra note 5, at 844-45 (explaining the differences in the two theories).
204. See 144 CONG. REC. S12,671 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1998) (statement of Sen.
DeWine).
205. See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 133 F.3d 704, 708 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that
defendant "carries" a firearm in a car for § 924(c)(1) purposes only when the firearm is
immediately accessible), vacated, 119 S.Ct. 32 (1998); United States v. Feliz-Cordero, 859
F.2d 250, 253 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that when a firearm is immediately accessible this
fulfills the "carrying" prong of § 924(c)(1)).
206. See Muscarello v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 1911, 1919 (1998) (finding that Congress did not intend the statute to be interpreted as requiring the application of the immediate accessibility test).
207. See Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 149 (1995); see also United States v.
Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3d 616, 623 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a defendant must do more
than merely possess or store a firearm to be convicted under § 924(c)(1)); Eme, supra note
15, at 15 (noting that the immediate accessibility test runs afoul of the Court's reasoning in
Bailey).
208. See generally Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, § 1, 112 Stat. 3469; 144
CONG. REC. H533 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1998) (statement of Rep. McCollum) (noting that
the firearm must be possessed in furtherance of the crime, not merely possessed on the
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Judiciary accepted the immediate accessibility test because it found that
"[t]he mere presence of a firearm in an area where a criminal act occurs"
is not enough to impose liability under the possession provision of the
statute.2 °9
The addition of a statutory possession standard will ultimately alleviate
the inconsistent punishment that defendants receive under § 924(c).21 °
Courts will have little difficulty applying a consistent standard to defendants convicted under the amendment because the law surrounding the
term possession is well defined.211 There may, however, be some problems in the interpretation of the "in furtherance of" language when it is
applied to the possession standard.
C. The "In FurtheranceOf' Standard
The addition of the "in furtherance of" standard requires the government to show that the defendant possessed the firearm to advance or
promote the perpetration of the underlying crime. The "in furtherance
of" standard encompasses the "during and in relation to" standard and
requires a slightly higher level of proof than the "during and in relation
to" standard.
Before the enactment of the latest amendment, courts' application of
the possession standard through the emboldening theory, the fortress
theory, and the immediate accessibility test 214 faced criticism on the
ground that it would punish legitimate possession. 21 The "during and in
relation to" clause of the statute ensured, however, that possession unrelated to the crime would not be punished.2 These same concerns resurfaced when Congress adopted the possession provision in the most re-

person of the defendant).
209. H.R. REP. No. 105-344, at 12 (1997). The Committee added that, even under the
possession standard, there would have been insufficient evidence to convict Bailey because the evidence did not meet the "in furtherance of" test. See id. at 13.
210. See Whiting, supra note 15, at 721 (giving examples of the inconsistent treatment
defendants received under the statute).
211. See id. at 720-21 (projecting the results of a possession amendment).
212. See H.R. REP. No. 105-344, at 12 (explaining the purpose behind each section of
the amendment).
213. See id. (discussing the distinctions between the two standards).
214. See supra Part III.B (outlining the varying possession theories).
215. See Whiting, supra note 15, at 720 (citing Violent and Drug Trafficking Crimes:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 6-9 (1996) (statement of
Kevin Di Gregory, Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Department of Justice
Criminal Division)).
216. See id. (discussing the misplaced criticism).
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cent amendment, 2" but were quickly quashed because of the required
standard of proof under the "in furtherance of" clause.218
After the release of the Bailey decision, legislative proposals to amend
used standards other than the "in furtherance of" standard to
924(c)
§
219
limit the statute. In some proposed amendments, the sponsors kept the
"during and in relation to" clause to quantify possession 220 but in another
proposed amendment, the sponsor attempted to modify the statute to include the immediate accessibility standard.22'
Before Bailey, Senator Dole attempted to clarify the statute by adding
217. See 144 CONG. REC. H533 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1998) (statement of Rep. Waters)
(noting the possibility that a hunter possessing both a hunting rifle and a small amount of
narcotics could be charged under the statute).
218. See 144 CONG. REC. S12,671 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1998) (statement of Sen. DeWine)
(stating that the new bill will not apply when there is "an insufficient nexus between the
crime and the gun"); 144 CONG. REC. H10,330 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1998) (statement of Rep.
McCollum) (noting that the new "bill will not affect any[one] who merely possesses a firearm").
Although most of the case law interpreting the "in furtherance of" standard involves
conspiracy charges, the Committee used those interpretations in formulating its explanation of the new standard. See H.R. REP. No. 105-344, at 12 (looking to established case
law to determine the meaning of the "in furtherance of" standard); see also FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2)(E) (excluding statements made "in furtherance of the conspiracy" from the
definition of hearsay); Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1949) (finding
that statements must be made in furtherance of the conspiracy in order to be excluded
from the hearsay rule).
The Committee looked also to the dictionary definitions of "furtherance" to aid in its inSee H.R. REP. No. 105-344, at 12 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW
terpretations.
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY and BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY both defining "furtherance" as the "'act of furthering, helping forward, promotion, advancement, or progress').
219. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text (outlining Congress' previous attempts to amend the statute).
220. See, e.g., S. 1612, 104th Cong. § 1 (1996) (striking the words "uses or carries" and
adding "possession"); H.R. 125, 104th Cong. § 5 (1996) (deleting "uses or carries" and inserting "possesses," "brandishes," and "discharges"). The Senate passed S. 1612 and referred it to the House; however, the bill never resurfaced. See 142 CONG. REC. S12,390
(daily ed. Oct. 3, 1996); Summary and Status of S. 1612, 104th Cong., available in
THOMAS (outlining the current status of the bill). The House also passed its bill, H.R.
125, but the bill died once it was referred to the Senate. See 142 CONG. REC. H2701 (daily
ed. Mar. 22, 1996); Summary and Status of H.R. 125, 104th Cong., available in THOMAS,
<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d104:HR00125:@@@L> (detailing the legislative
status of the bill).
221. See S. 1945, 104th Cong. (1996). This bill would have inserted "or has a firearm in
close proximity to illegal drugs or drug proceeds, in close proximity at the time of his or
her arrest, or in close proximity at the point of sale of illegal drugs" after "uses or carries a
firearm" in the statute. Id. Senator DeWine introduced this bill on July 11, 1996, but after
it was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, it never resurfaced. See 142
CONG. REC. S7764-65 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Sen. DeWine); Summary and
Status of S. 1945, 104th Cong., available in THOMAS, <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d104:SN01945:@@@L> (noting the last action on the bill).
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"or otherwise possesses" to the "uses or carries" language and defining
possession of a firearm as "readily available at the scene of the crime
during the commission of the crime. 222 This type of language initially
appeared in the latest amendment, but was removed after the Department of Justice opposed any definition of the word "possess., 22 The
Department of Justice argued that defining possession in a statute is not
only "unnecessary and inappropriate," but that the definition proposed
in the bill was "seriously flawed" because it did not cover many common
situations.224
Although the latest amendment added the "in furtherance of" standard to the statute, if the "during and in relation to" clause is used, it still
applies to the "uses," "carries," "brandishes," and "discharges" language. 225 In the Smith case, the Supreme Court found that the "in relation to" language requires the government to prove that the firearm had
"some purpose or effect" on the underlying crime. 22' The firearm's presence cannot be coincidental or unrelated to the crime. 22' The Committee
on the Judiciary stated that previous court interpretations of the "during
and in relation to" clause remain pertinent under the new amendment.228
D. Problemsand Criticisms of the Latest Amendment
Although the latest amendment to § 924(c) garnered considerable
support in Congress, several legislators opposed the measure.129 The
amendment increased the length of sentences for second offenses from
twenty years to twenty-five years, added a seven year sentence for brandishing a firearm, and added a ten year sentence for discharging a fire222. S. 1356, 103d Cong. § 1007 (1993).
223. See Letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant Att'y Gen. for Legislative Affairs, Dept.
of Justice, to Congressman Henry Hyde, Chairman, House Judiciary Comm., reprinted in
H.R. REP. No. 105-344, at 15 (1997) [hereinafter Letter from Andrew Fois] (citing H.R.
424, 105th Cong. § 1 (1997)) (arguing against including a definition of possession in the
statute).
224. See id. The Department added that no other statute defined possession, that
courts could easily interpret the possession standard, and that defining possession might
limit the scope of the statute to its list of arguments against inclusion. See id. at 15-16.
225. See Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, § 1, 112 Stat. 3469 (applying the
"during and in relation to" clause to the "uses or carries" language and the new brandishing and discharging language).
226. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 238 (1993) (analyzing the "during and in
relation to" clause of the statute).
227. See id.
228. See H.R. REP. No. 105-344, at 13.
229. See, e.g, 144 CONG. REC. H535 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1998) (counting the votes for
H.R. 424 as 350 in favor, 59 opposed, and 21 not voting); H.R. REP. No. 105-344, at 19-20
(noting the dissenting views of several congressional members).
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arm.3 Several representatives opposed the amendment because they
felt that these increased penalties were too severe, especially when compared with sentences for other violent crimes.3 The Department of Justice and the American Bar Association also opposed the new penalty
structure because they found that the existing penalties were adequate.232
The Department of Justice also found the brandishing provision to be
"unsound" and questioned the appropriateness of such a dramatic difference in the sentencing provision. 33
In opposition to the amendment, Representative Scott introduced another amendment that would have kept the current penalty structure, but
given the United States Sentencing Commission the power to assess current penalties and make recommendations.
The majority opposed this
235
amendment, however, in a voice vote. Subsequently, during debates on
the bill, Representative Scott urged his fellow members to let the Sentencing Commission increase penalties if needed and to oppose the bill.236
Ultimately, the amendment passed without any reference to the Sentencing Commission. 37
Some of the opposition surrounding the amendment came also in response to the cost of the legislation. The Congressional Budget Office
estimated that the cost of implementing the amendment would be $10

230. See Pub. L. No. 105-386 § 1, 112 Stat. at 3469; supra notes 22-23 (quoting the previous and current versions of the statute).
231. See 144 CONG. REC. E228 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1998) (statement of Rep. DeGette)
(opposing the bill because it punished "criminals based not on their crime but on whether
or not they possess[ed] a gun and the type of gun they possess[ed]"); 144 CONG. REC.
H531 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1998) (statement of Rep. Scott) (finding the penalty structure
"out of proportion to the crimes committed"); H.R. REP. No. 105-344, at 19-20.
232. See 144 CONG. REC. H532 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1998) (statement of Rep. Scott) (indicating the American Bar Association's opposition to the changes in penalties); Letter
from Andrew Fois, supra note 223, at 16 (finding the new penalty structure problematic
and complex).
233. See Letter from Andrew Fois, supra note 223, at 16-17 (outlining the Department's problems with the brandishing provision).
234. See H.R. REP. No. 105-344, at 20.
235. See id.
236. See 144 CONG. REC. H10,330 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1998) (statement of Rep. Scott).
Scott urged the House to let the Commission "take the politics out of sentencing and put
some common sense in." Id. Representative Waters agreed and stated that creating sentencing from the floor of Congress is problematic because everyone has different views on
the subject. See 144 CONG. REC. H532 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1998) (statement of Rep. Waters). Therefore, according to Representative Waters, this task should be left to the Sentencing Commission. See id.
237. See Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469.
238. See 144 CONG. REC. H532 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1998) (statement of Rep. Scott) (arguing against the amendment because of the high estimated costs).
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million over the next five years.13' This estimate included the price of accommodating more prisoners in federal prisons and the cost of constructing new prisons.240 Again, Representative Scott challenged the
amendment claiming that there were more cost-effective
ways to control
241
crime than using mandatory minimum sentences.
IV. CONCLUSION
In recent years, the Supreme Court has had ample opportunity to interpret the terms and provisions found in § 924(c). In general, when
Congress finds fault with the way the Court interpreted a statute, Congress tries quickly to rectify the situation by amending the statute at issue. The latest amendment to § 924(c) is no exception. Congress added
the possession standard as a remedy to the problems the Bailey decision
created. Although the "problems" may be resolved in Congress' eyes,
the Supreme Court will surely have another chance to interpret the revised version of the statute.

239. See H.R. REP. No. 105-344, at 10.
240. See id. at 11.
241. See 144 CONG. REC. H532 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1998) (statement of Rep. Scott).
Scott quoted survey findings that mandatory minimum sentences "were one of the least
cost effective ways to reduce crime." Id.

